

CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN

(1969 - 1979)

by

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
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This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any university, and to the best of my knowledge and belief contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text.


Samina Yasmeen

For My Parents

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An explanation concerning the spelling of
Chinese Names and Places:

On 1 January 1979 the Pinyin or Chinese phonetic alphabet was officially adopted in the People's Republic of China to replace the Wade-Giles conventional system that has been used for over a century to translate Chinese names and places. For this thesis, however, a mixture of both the systems is used. Names of leaders who were in prominence or died before 1979 are spelt in Wade-Giles, such as Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung; otherwise there would be unnecessary confusion with their spellings in the sources cited in the footnotes. For all the current PRC leaders the 'Pinyin' system is used.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of Chinese policy towards Pakistan during the period from 1969 to 1979. Its central concerns are:

- a) to determine the nature of Beijing's policy towards Islamabad during the period under review, and
- b) explain the reasons for the continuity and/or changes in this policy.

Before addressing itself to these central questions, this thesis discusses the nature of China's relations with Pakistan during the first two decades of its existence. After pursuing a "correct" policy towards Pakistan during the 1950s, it is argued, Beijing moved to establish a "close" relationship to Islamabad in the wake of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Pakistan was provided substantial political, economic and military assistance by China during the 1963-68.

The period from 1969-79, however, this thesis attempts to demonstrate, did not always witness a continuity of this close relationship. To this end, it employs a thematic approach. The issues which have been identified as significant for Pakistan, and on which the Chinese response has been examined include the Kashmir dispute, the East-Pakistan Crisis and the Indo-Pakistan War (1971), the "New" Pakistan's post-war problems, the Indian nuclear explosion and Pakistan's proposal for a Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia, the emergence of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan (April 1978 - December 1979) and Chinese military and economic assistance for Pakistan.

This is followed by an attempt to explain the reasons for changes in Chinese policy toward Pakistan in the framework of Beijing's fear of Soviet encirclement. After the major Sino-Soviet

border clashes (March 1969), it is argued, the Chinese Government attempted to improve relations with India. As these moves showed signs of success, with an aim to convince New Delhi of its interest in rapprochement, Beijing began to limit its support for Islamabad. This became especially apparent during the East Pakistan crisis. This policy of limiting Chinese support for Pakistan in order to facilitate the Sino-Indian normalisation of relations, it is argued, would have continued, had the Indian government not elicited Soviet support to dismember Pakistan towards the end of 1971. Prospects of the Soviet Union emerging as a major external power in the subcontinent and the concomitant danger of reduced Chinese influence in the region motivated Beijing to shelve its policy of improving relations with India and concentrate on supporting the already acquired but quite weak ally Pakistan. During 1972-75, therefore, China provided substantial political, military and economic assistance to Pakistan. In 1976, however, when Sino-Indian rapprochement got under way Beijing once again reduced the level of its support for Islamabad. This trend, it is argued, would have continued had a pro-Soviet regime not come to power in Afghanistan. The rise of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the strengthening of Soviet-Vietnam relations intensified Chinese fear of encirclement. So after a period of concentrating on Iran as a pillar of its anti-Soviet policy in West Asia, Beijing began to rely on Pakistan to "contain" Soviet "expansion". This marked the beginning of an upward trend in Chinese support for Pakistan in 1979 --- a trend which has since continued.

INTRODUCTION

South Asia, as mentioned by a scholar, is a veritable garden of delights for international relations analysts and theoreticians.¹ It is the locus of a complex and neverending rivalry between two regional actors, India and Pakistan; a site of small states like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal operating in a subsystem; and is the only region to have witnessed a successful secession movement in recent times. At the same time, it has been and continues to be the venue of important and widely varying interaction among three major powers: the United States, the Soviet Union and China. The web of relationships thus arising, the complexity of which has been amply demonstrated since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has been frequently subjected to scholarly investigations. Chinese relations with Pakistan are no exception. Although in the last fifteen years only two studies have focused on the relationship between these two states,² a number of others have treated it as one of the significant interactions taking place in the region.³

The common theme emphasised in these studies is the continuity and durability of Sino-Pakistan relations. The relationship between

¹Thomas Perry Thornton's remarks in the foreword for Yaacov Vertzberger, The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations 1960-1980, Washington Papers, No.95, (Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1983).

²Anwar Hussain Syed, China & Pakistan: Entente Cordiale, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); and Yaacov Vertzberger, The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations 1960-1980.

³Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia, (New York: Pegasus, 1970); G.W.Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, (New York: The Free Press, 1975); J.P.Jain, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974); James David Armstrong, The United Front Doctrine and China's Foreign Policy, Ph.D Thesis, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1975); and Mohammad Habib Sidky, The Theory And Conduct of Chinese Foreign Policy in South Asia: Peking's Relations With Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1970-1976, Ph.D Thesis, (Florida: University of Miami, 1978)

China, a major Communist state, and Pakistan, a regional theocratic Muslim state, it is assumed, has acquired the nature of a constant factor in international politics. This assumption is reflected, for instance, in the most recent study on the subject which is entitled The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations 1960-1980. That this should be the case is hardly surprising. Since the early 1960s when, after maintaining a 'correct' relationship in the 1950s, China and Pakistan came closer to each other, the two states have frequently talked of the enduring nature of their relations. The Chinese media coverage is replete with statements to this effect. Even the Pakistan government periodically asserts that close links with China are a major plank of Pakistan's foreign policy. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, for instance, when asked by a Newsweek correspondent if Pakistan's options included keeping the distance from both the superpowers, or moving closer to the United States, General Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan replied: 'I am in favour of a third option. The cornerstone is our relationship with China. They have given us tremendous moral and material strength'.⁴

This thesis attempts to judge, and question, the validity of these claims and assumptions. The time-frame chosen for this purpose is from 1969 to 1979. These eleven years have seen three different governments in operation in China, and four different regimes in Pakistan. They have also witnessed major regional and global changes including the Sino-Soviet border clashes, Sino-U.S. rapprochement, China's entry into the United Nations, secession of

⁴Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'A Talk With Zia', Newsweek, 14 January 1980, p. 12

the erstwhile East Pakistan as Bangladesh, the oil crisis, India's entry into the nuclear club, and the emergence of a pro-soviet regime in Kabul culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is, therefore, a sufficiently long a time period for analysis to be made with a view to determining a general behaviour pattern with some implications for the future.

Within this time-frame this thesis poses two central questions:

1. What has been the nature of Chinese policy towards Pakistan? and
2. What are the explanations^{for} for the continuity and/or changes in this policy?

Answers to these questions, it is hoped, will not only provide information on China's relations with one of its southwestern neighbours but also enable the experts on South Asia to gain a better understanding of the policy options available to Pakistan at a stage when it is sharing borders with two major and mutually antagonistic powers: the Soviet Union and China.

The approach adopted to answer the first question is principally a thematic one. Various issues, which were considered significant by the Pakistan Government during the period under review, are identified and then the extent of Chinese support for Islamabad on these issues is assessed. Once the general pattern of this support is discerned a chronological approach is employed to explain the presence or absence of fluctuation in Chinese policy towards Pakistan with specific reference to Beijing's threat perceptions since late 1960s.

To this end, this thesis has relied on a wide variety of sources. On the top of the list are Chinese publications in English such as Xinhua News Bulletin, Beijing Review, and English translations of Chinese sources appearing in the Survey of China

Mainland Press, Daily Report:China, and the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Other sources include press clippings from files at the Australian National University, Parliamentary Library (Canberra), Chatham House (London), the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London), the Institute of Strategic Studies (Islamabad), the National Defence College (Rawalpindi) and the Pakistan Air Force Staff College (Karachi). These have been supplemented with Government publications and press handouts, particularly those from the Economic Affairs Division of Pakistan, the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office. UN documents have also been used for examination of General Assembly debates and those in various committees. For the military dimensions of the relationship, the information provided by the Military Balance, SIPRI Year Books, the Jane's Fighting Ships, and Jane's All the World's Aircraft proved invaluable.

The secondary sources used have been principally from the disciplines of International Relations and Political Science. In some cases, secondary sources from Economics have also been used. These sources have been supplemented with interviews with individuals who have been directly involved with the developments in Sino-Pakistan relations. Due to the contemporaneous nature of the study, and the agreement between Beijing and Islamabad prohibiting communication of any information no matter how insignificant, however, the names of these individuals are not listed.

Structurally, the thesis is divided into three parts. The first part, which comprises of two chapters, sets out the context of the study. It outlines the evolution of China's policy towards Pakistan during the 1950s, the changes in this policy at the turn of the 1960s, and China's support for Pakistan in the political, military and economic sectors until the end of 1968.

The second part addresses itself to the task of determining the

nature of Chinese policy towards Pakistan during the period from 1969-1979. Since the Pakistan Government, for a variety of reasons, has been periodically raising the Kashmir Issue, this part begins in Chapter III by discussing the changes and the continuities in Beijing's stand on this issue during the period under review. Chapter IV concerns itself with the most traumatic period in Pakistan history, the East Pakistan Crisis which began with the notorious military crackdown and, following the Fourth Indo-Pakistan war (1971), culminated in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. This chapter describes the evolution of Beijing's policy on this major issue from one of maintaining a studied silence to openly siding with Islamabad. Chapter V centers on discussing the multiple problems encountered by the Government of 'new' Pakistan -- or what was left of the 'old' Pakistan -- and then assesses the extent to which Beijing, in contrast to other major powers, assisted Islamabad in solving these problems. Chapter VI is a study of Pakistan's heightened fear of insecurity after the Indian nuclear explosion, its search for a 'nuclear umbrella' and China's response to this call. It also concerns itself with the nature of Pakistan's proposal to declare South Asia a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and the subtle changes in Chinese support for this proposal from 1974 to 1979. Chapter VII concentrates on Sino-Pakistan relations with respect to the emergence of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan in April 1978. It seeks to analyse Pakistan's threat perceptions in the wake of this change, and then discusses Beijing's willingness, or lack of it, to assure Pakistan of its support. The discussion ends on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Chapter VIII deals with the military and economic dimensions of Chinese policy towards Pakistan. The emphasis, as in the previous chapters, is on determining the extent to which this support has continued during the 1969-1979 period.

The final part, which is also divided into two chapters, begins by partially concluding the findings of the second part, and then seeks to explain the fluctuations in Beijing's support for Islamabad during the period under investigation. The framework chosen for this explanation is the perennial Chinese fear of encirclement and the strategies adopted to counter this perceived encirclement. However, to ensure that the analysis is as complete as the available information permits, other factors which may have accounted for the changes and/or continuity in Beijing's policy are also discussed. This, as previously mentioned, is covered in two chapters; Chapter IX sets out the Chinese fear of encirclement during the 1950s and 1960s and its strategies for the South Asian region; discusses Beijing's threat perceptions since the late 1960s and then explains the nuances of Chinese policy towards Pakistan until the end of the Indo-Pakistan war (1971). Chapter X focuses on explaining Beijing's relations with the 'new' Pakistan i.e. during the period from December 1971 to December 1979.

Finally, the answers to the two questions posed in the beginning of the study are briefly summarised in the Conclusion.

PART ONE

CHAPTER I

CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN DURING THE 1950S

At midnight on 14-15 August 1947, the British Government formally withdrew from the Indian subcontinent and transferred power to the new Dominions of India and Pakistan. On the eve of independence, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and Governor-General designate of Pakistan identified as he had before,¹ creation and maintenance of 'goodwill and friendship ... with Hindustan' as one of the major objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy.² The course of Indo-Pakistan relations, however, demonstrated the unattainability of this goal. Disputes arose over the procedure for exchange of evacuee property, division of the waters of the Indus, and Pakistan's share of undivided India's military and financial assets.³

The major dispute, however arose when the Indian Government accepted the Maharaja of Kashmir's accession of October 1947 and sent troops into Kashmir. The Pakistan Government refused to accept the legality of the accession,⁴ and demanded withdrawal of Indian forces. India refused and the issue was finally referred to the UN Security Council on 31 December 1947.

¹At a press conference in New Delhi on 15 November 1946, for instance, Mohammed Ali Jinnah said: 'Whatever others might say, I think that ... Pakistan and Hindustan, by virtue of contiguity and mutual interest, will be friends in the sub-continent. They will go to each other's rescue in case of danger and will be able to say 'hands off' to other nations. We shall then have a Monroe Doctrine more solid than in America'. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, Vol. II, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1964), p.363.

²Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan - 1947-1948, (Karachi: Feroze Sons Ltd., 1963), pp.12-13.

³For details of Pakistan's position on these various disputes, see S.M.Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.10-15. For Indian position on the same disputes, see B.L.Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis, (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1968), pp.18-35.

⁴Keessing's Contemporary Archives 1946-48, 8-15 November 1947, pp.8930-8931.

In early April 1948, while the Security Council was still deliberating, India mounted an offensive in Kashmir against the tribesmen. The initial success of this operation was viewed by Pakistan as entailing the possibility of Indian occupation of strategically significant positions along the Pakistan-Kashmir border.⁵ To avoid such an eventuality, the Pakistan Government ordered its Army units to move into Kashmir and fight their Indian counterparts. The war came to an end on 1 January when the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), established by the Security Council resolution of 20 January 1948, got the two states to agree to proposals for mutual withdrawal, followed by a plebiscite. In line with this agreement, the UN General-Secretary appointed a US Fleet Admiral, Chester W. Nimitz, as the Plebiscite Administrator on 22 March 1949, and by the end of July 1949 India and Pakistan agreed on a cease-fire line. However, this did not bring the Indo-Pakistan dispute to an end as both states soon began to disagree over demilitarisation of Kashmir.⁶

At this stage, another problem arose between the two major South Asian states. Following the British decision in September 1949 to

⁵General Douglas Gracey, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army had warned the Pakistan Government that if the Indian Army was allowed to advance, it would cross the Ravi and Chenab Rivers and come right up to Pakistan's borders thereby threatening the Jhelum bridge, controlling the Mangla headworks and having the irrigation in Jhelum and other districts at their mercy. The loss of Kohala or Muzafarabad would enable the Indian Army to secure the rear gateway to Pakistan through which, he said, the Indians could march in at any time. This position, according to Burke, was accepted by the Pakistan Government. Burke, op.cit., pp.31-32.

⁶Ibid., pp.32-36.

devalue its pound vis-a-vis the American dollar by 30.5 %, India decided to devalue its currency as well. Pakistan, however, refused to follow suit thereby not only making India pay 44 % more than before for Pakistani jute, cotton and foodgrains but also reducing by two-thirds the real value of the 3 billion rupees debt it owed to India. The Indian Government retaliated by severing all trade links thus depriving its own mills of the required raw materials but more importantly denying Pakistan the urgently needed supply of coal.⁷ It was at this juncture in the history of Indo-Pakistan relations that the Communists gained ascendancy in China after 28 years of revolutionary struggle.

which itself had gained independence only two years ago,
Pakistan reacted sympathetically to the Communists' success in China. 'As Asia gains in political importance internationally', wrote the Muslim League's newspaper Dawn on 3 October 1949, 'Pakistan will also share it'.⁸ Eleven days later, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafarullah Khan, declared in a press conference that the question of according recognition to the Communist regime 'would have to be faced' and urged the Western powers to treat the matter realistically.⁹ The next month, Pakistan opposed Nationalist China's resolution in the United Nations for withholding all aid to Communist China and, arguing in favour of the Chinese people's right to choose their own form of government, voted in favour of a 'hands off China' resolution.¹⁰ On 5 January 1950 it recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) and on 24 January 1950 officially withdrew its

⁷ Ibid., pp.14-15; and W.Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 166-168.

⁸ Dawn, 3 October 1949.

⁹ Dawn, 15 October 1949.

¹⁰ Warner Levi, 'Soviet Union, China and Pakistan', Pacific Affairs, Vol. xxxv, No.3, Fall 1962, p.219.

recognition from the Kuomintang Government in Taiwan.¹¹

After the recognition, Pakistan became one of the first champions of the PRC's claim to the China seat at the United Nations. On September 1950, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafarullah Khan argued in the General Assembly that China was not applying for admission to the United Nations as it was already a permanent member of the Security Council. The issue confronting the UN, therefore, was to determine who was to represent the Chinese people at the international organization.^{The} Kuomintang, he emphasised, had ceased to exercise effective jurisdiction over mainland China and, hence, could not be considered a representative of the Chinese people or China. The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, by virtue of its effective control over the mainland was 'entitled as of right to be represented in the United Nations like every other member state...'. He also questioned the argument put forth by some states that the Beijing Government would not be willing to discharge the obligations contained in the United Nations charter. The argument, he maintained, was no more than an assumption and that it could not be denied that Beijing was 'certainly able to discharge those obligations were it so willing, and that its willingness [was] ... a matter of its own choice, which it [was] ... free at any time to make'. As against this, he emphasised, the Nationalist Government, however willing it might be, had lost the ability to assume or discharge those obligations on behalf of the people of China and that this lack of ability could not be remedied at its own choice. The General Assembly, he said, was unwilling to concede the existence of a fact,

¹¹ R.K.Jain (ed.), China, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Vol II: Basic Documents - 1950-1976, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1977), pp.1-2.

not because the fact had not been established, but because the majority regarded it as unpleasant. To prove that Karachi was willing to accept the fact, Pakistan voted in favour of India's resolution calling for the immediate seating of the PRC.¹²

Having recognised the PRC, Pakistan also pursued a policy of not antagonising Beijing. During the Korean War, in spite of initially supporting the Security Council Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950, Karachi refused an American request to send its forces on behalf of the UN and contributed only 5,000 tons of foodgrain.¹³ After initially favouring a policy of bringing the whole of Korea under the occupation of the UN forces in October 1950,¹⁴ it also pleaded for the cessation of hostilities on the 38th Parallel and criticised the states that had assumed that China did not want peace.¹⁵ Subsequently, Pakistan refrained from criticising China's occupation of Tibet. Dawn, for instance, emphasised Pakistan's acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and referred to a statement made by the Pakistan Ambassador to the United States that the occupation would not irk Karachi as Tibet was quite far removed from Pakistan. In November 1950, when the issue of Chinese occupation was being discussed in the UN at the request of the Tibetan government,

¹²UN Document A/PV 283, 25 September 1950, cited by J.P.Jain, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974), pp.16-17.

¹³M.A.H.Ispani, 'The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: 1947-1964', Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XVII, No.3, Third Quarter 1964, p.237.

¹⁴On 2 October 1950, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafarullah Khan issued a statement in Ottawa in which he said that there was nothing sacrosanct about the 38th Parallel which had no significance and which was never recognised by the United Nations and that it was merely a convenient line of demarcation between the occupied territories. As the North Korean objective was to bring about the unification of Korea, he said the United Nations was fully justified in crossing that Parallel and bringing the whole of Korea under the occupation of the United Nations forces. Dawn, 3 October 1950.

¹⁵Burke, op.cit., p.102.

Pakistan declared its neutrality in the proceedings.¹⁶

The Chinese response to Pakistan's sympathetic and realistic attitude, however, was quite cool in the beginning. Beijing did not acknowledge the receipt of Pakistan's letter of recognition dated 5 January 1950, and sent a reply note on 4 February 1950 only after Karachi had sent another letter on 29 January 1950 reiterating its recognition of Mao's regime as the legal government of China. In its reply note, Beijing bluntly refused Karachi's request to consider Lt. Col. Mohammed Sadiq, stationed in Kashgar, as Pakistan's 'righteous and trusted representative in Sinkiang', and informed Karachi that until a formal exchange of diplomatic representatives he would be treated 'as a foreign national'. In the same note, Beijing accepted Karachi's request to provide all facilities to diplomat Tajuddin and his personnel stationed in Nanking to move to Beijing and initiate talks for establishing diplomatic relations.¹⁷ It was, however, not until after September 1950 that Beijing began to identify Tajuddin as a 'Negotiating Representative' (a title reserved for representatives with whom the Chinese Government had initiated talks to establish diplomatic relations), and it was another seven months before diplomatic relations were established between the two states in May 1951.¹⁸ Thereafter, Beijing began to expand its already existing trade relations with Karachi. The total volume of Chinese trade with Pakistan, comprising primarily coal exports and cotton imports, increased from Rs. 160.4 million in 1950 to Rs. 175.5 million in 1951.¹⁹ At the political level, however, China remained cool towards

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 106-107.

¹⁷ R.K.Jain, op.cit., pp. 1-3.

¹⁸ J.P.Jain, op.cit., pp. 17-18.

¹⁹ Pakistan Economic Survey: 1978-79, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, 1979).

Pakistan until the turn of the year. In November 1951, for example, while receiving the credentials of the first Pakistani Ambassador, General Raza, Mao remarked sarcastically: 'I have great pleasure in receiving the letters of credentials of the King of Great Britain, Ireland and British Dominions beyond the seas presented by you!'²⁰

Beginning in 1952, Beijing warmed up slightly to Karachi; it signed its first trade agreement with Pakistan in April 1952, and occasionally exchanged delegations. Initially, during these exchanges, Beijing emphasised its tolerance of various religions, especially Islam. The conditions of Chinese Muslims, it pointed out, had improved since the Communists had come to power, thereby suggesting that there was no inherent contradiction between Islam and Communism. The presence of these Muslims, Beijing suggested, had provided a link between China and the sub-continent in the past, and it still provided venues which could be explored to develop Sino-Pakistan relations.²¹ This emphasis on ^{the}'Islamic connection', which probably was aimed at appealing to Pakistan's sense of Muslim identity, tapered off as Pakistan moved away from a policy of attempting to forge closer links with Muslim states to one of aligning itself with the United States.

After the State Department's approval in December 1951, the Pakistan Government and the Pentagon had begun talks in the following spring and an agreement in principle had been reached by mid-1952 for a limited US arms assistance programme for Pakistan. The final decision on the agreement, however, had been withheld during the last

²⁰Hindu, 29 November 1950.

²¹For example, Ibrahim Jalees, 'I met Muslims in New China', People's China, February 1953, p.11; see also, New China News Agency (Hereafter cited as NCNA), 14 October 1952, in Survey of China Mainland Press (Hereafter cited as SCMP, No.434, October 1952, p.1-4; and NCNA, 20 October 1952, in SCMP, No.439, October p.24.

few months of Truman's administration, due to the objections of Bowles, US Ambassador to India, George Kennan's and Dean Acheson's lack of enthusiasm.²² The situation changed with the advent of the Eisenhower-Dulles era in 1953. After his failure to convince the majority of the Middle Eastern and South Asian states to establish a Middle Eastern Defense Organization (MEDO), the US Secretary of State, Dulles, projected the idea of concluding bilateral agreements with individual states which could later lead to a more formal anti-Communist regional security system. Pakistan, he pointed out, was one of the states with which such a bilateral agreement could be concluded.²³ The discussion on the US-Pakistan military agreement, therefore, was revived. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Ayub, visited Washington in October 1953, followed the next month by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed and Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan. It was, however, not until after US Vice-President Nixon's visit to Karachi in early December that Washington finally decided to offer military assistance to Pakistan within the context of a pact between Pakistan and Turkey.²⁴ On 19 February Pakistan and Turkey announced their agreement to study ways 'of strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also in that of all peace-loving nations of the world.'²⁵ Three days later, Prime Minister Bogra announced that his government had requested American military assistance under the Mutual Security Act. On February 1954, President Eisenhower announced his administration's

²²William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p.92.

²³Secretary Dulles's statement, Wheat for Pakistan: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 12 June 1953, pp.4-5.

²⁴Burke, op.cit., pp.162-163.

²⁵Dawn, 20 25 February 1954.

decision to respond favourably to the request in the interest of increased stability and strength in the Middle East.²⁶ These declarations of intent were given concrete shape by conclusion of the Turco-Pakistan Pact in April 1954 and a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the US and Pakistan in May.

Beijing initially responded to the pro-US tilt in Pakistan's foreign policy by totally ignoring the developments in US-Pakistan relations and identifying Pakistan as a non-aligned state. In late 1952 and early 1953, for instance, except once when the New China News Agency (NCNA) referred to an Indian Communist, Dr. Gyan Chand's analysis that Pakistan was being dragged into MEDO with the aim of attracting India,²⁷ the Chinese news media refrained from commenting on, or even reporting, the widespread speculations that Karachi might join the defence organisation. In fact, after Dulles' failure to establish MEDO, the Chinese media grouped Pakistan with other states which had opposed the idea and completely refrained from referring to the warm welcome Dulles was accorded in Pakistan in May 1954, during the visit to eleven South Asian and Middle Eastern states which he undertook in order to assess the feasibility of a Middle Eastern Defense Organization.²⁸ Later, in September 1953, while proposing that the Korean Political Conference should be attended by some neutral states in addition to all the belligerents of the two sides, the Chinese Government suggested that Pakistan should be invited

²⁶ Burke, *op.cit.*, p.164.

²⁷ NCNA, 20 February 1953, in *SCMP*, No.518, 24 February 1953, p.19.

²⁸ Commenting on Dulles's trip to the Middle and Near Eastern states in April-May 1953 to set up MEDO, for example, NCNA claimed that 'from Egypt to India, [he] ... was met with angry protests ... of the people in every country he visited'. (emphasis added) 'US Long Cherished Scheme for setting up a Middle East Command Shattered: Commentary', NCNA, 4 June 1953, in *SCMP*, No.583, 5 June 1953, p.10.

along with India, the Soviet Union, Indonesia and Burma.²⁹

By the end of November 1953, however, Pakistan's tilt towards the United States had become too obvious to be ignored. Western news media were openly reporting that the United States was considering providing sizeable military aid to Pakistan, similar to that given to Turkey.³⁰ Beijing, therefore, moved to a policy of acknowledging the existence of US-Pakistan negotiations for military assistance. On 1 December 1953, a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial stated that 'the United States, having signed military agreements with Spain and Greece, [was] ... holding talks with Pakistan for a military alliance to build new military alliances and expand the network of its war bases in various parts of the world'.³¹ This was followed by another editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao on 9 December 1953 which, for the first time, reflected Beijing's reaction to the US-Pakistan military negotiations.

The Chinese Government, the editorial suggested, was concerned with the possibility of a US-Pakistan military alliance and the prospect of American military bases in both eastern and western parts of Pakistan due to their geographical proximity to South-western China. However, unlike the Soviet Government which had asked Pakistan on 30 November 1953 to 'clarify questions regarding conclusion of a military alliance with the United States and its joining the aggressive Middle Eastern bloc',³² it was not willing to express its concern officially to the Pakistan Government. Therefore, it opted

²⁹'The Question of Enlarging the Composition of the Political Conference Must be Discussed', Jen-min Jih-pao, 14 September 1953, in SCMP, No.650, 15 September 1953, p.3.

³⁰See, for example, Newsweek, 30 November 1953.

³¹NCNA, 1 December 1953, in SCMP, No.699, 2 December 1953, p.2.

³²Dawn, 1 December 1953.

for a policy of emphasising the opposition of the 'people of China',³³ and not of the Chinese Government, to the proposed US-Pakistan military alliance while simultaneously cautioning Pakistan against being used as a pawn by the United States. '...US war makers', the editorial stated, 'for a long time have been trying to drag Pakistan into planned US Middle East and Southeast Asia aggressive blocs and to convert Pakistan into an important war base for the United States in this region'. The US plan to provide Pakistan US\$250 million annually as military assistance, it suggested, was a ploy to achieve this goal and 'get the rights to set up military bases in ... Pakistan'. 'This intrigue of the US war bloc in Pakistan', it argued, 'is part and parcel of the sinister plans to intensify aggression in Asia'.³⁴ By urging Pakistan to conclude an alliance with Turkey, it explained, the United States was attempting to put pressure on various Arab states which were reluctant to join the US aggressive organization. Moreover, the editorial explained, the United States wanted to form an aggressive bloc extending from the Middle East to the Far East to 'menace peace-lovers in Asia to a great extent'. To this end, it wanted 'to take advantage of Pakistan's strategic position ... [which was] situated between the Middle East and Southeast Asia, ... consist[ed] of eastern and western parts, [and, therefore, could be used] to link the [US] aggressive power in the Middle East with that in Southeast Asia'. The editorial also referred to a western media report that in

³³The editorial stated: 'The people of China are closely following activities by the US and Pakistan for a military alliance.... The people of China will not regard with indifference the American plan to set up military bases in ... [Pakistan] and turn it into a hotbed of war and a source of international disputes'. 'Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial on US-Pakistan Military Alliance Talks', NCNA, 9 December in SCMP, No.705, 10 December 1953, p.22.

³⁴Ibid, pp.20- 21

return for military aid, the US aimed at acquiring bases in Pakistan wherefrom its Strategic Command could attack the main industrial centers in the Asiatic Soviet Union in case of war, and then proceeded to suggest that Karachi's acceptance of the alliance would bring war to its threshold and turn Pakistan 'into a springboard for the American adventurists to unleash a third war'. To forestall such a development, Karachi was advised, and not warned, to refrain from concluding an alliance with the United States.³⁵

Beijing continued its policy of advising Pakistan against the 'US machinations' even after Karachi had expressed officially its intentions of concluding pacts with Turkey and the United States. On 16 April 1954, for instance, NCNA referred to western media to allege that the United States wanted to control Asia and that, instead of maintaining its own troops abroad at an annual cost of \$US250 million per division, it was trying to achieve this goal by using the least expensive reserves of manpower, i.e. the Asians themselves. To this end, it commented, the United States had been providing 'military aid' and dispatching 'experts' or 'advisors' for 'supervision', and 'technical training' to various Asian countries like Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. The US military aid to Pakistan, it suggested, therefore, was also a part of US design to convert Pakistan's manpower into cannon-fodder --- an attempt which Karachi would be wise to thwart.³⁶

Meanwhile, the Chinese press began to underscore the regional

³⁵Ibid., p.21 (emphasis added).

³⁶'US Working Hard to Collect Cannon-Fodder in Asia', NCNA, 16 April 1954, in SCMP, No.790, 16-19 April 1954, pp.31-32; see also, 'US Faced with Great Difficulties in Its Ambition of World Hegemony', NCNA, 12 January 1954, in SCMP, No. 727, 14 January 1954, pp.11-12; and 'Pakistan's Pacts with Turkey and the US Would Menace Peace in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia: Jen-min Jih-pao Commentary', NCNA, 23 March 1954, in SCMP, No. 773, 24 March 1954, p.17-18

implications of Pakistan's pact with the United States. The alliance, it pointed out, would drive a wedge between Pakistan and the Arab world with which Karachi was so eager to establish close relations. It would also alienate, it suggested, other Asian states, e.g. Nepal, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan.³⁷ Special emphasis, however, was placed on the implications of the pact for Indo-Pakistan relations. 'Since the eastern and western parts of Pakistan lie on either side of India', a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial stated, 'American military bases would mean placing military bases on India's two flanks. Add to this the American plan to set up military bases in Goa, the Portuguese colony in India, and in Trincomalee, Ceylon, [and] India would be confronted with political and military encirclement'. India, the editorial suggested could not tolerate such a situation and, therefore, was likely to react against Pakistan's pact with the United States. This worsening of Indo-Pakistan relations, it emphasised, would in turn make a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue more difficult.³⁸

The emphasis on ^{the} global and regional implications of Karachi's links was complemented with a regular and wide coverage of statements made by Pakistani notables in order to prove that people in both

³⁷'People the World Over Oppose US Building of Military Bases in Foreign Countries', NCNA, 18 January 1954, in SCMP, No. 730, 19 January 1954, p.6; see also, NCNA, March 1954, in SCMP, No.768, 17 March 1954, p.22

³⁸'Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial on US-Pakistan Military Alliance Talks', NCNA, 9 December 1953, in SCMP, No.705, 10 December 1953, p.21-22; see also, for example, 'People the World Over Oppose US Building of Military Bases in Foreign Countries', op.cit., p.6; and 'Nehru Rejects American Military Aid', NCNA, 2 March 1954, in SCMP, No.758, 3 March 1954, pp.9-10 It is important to point out that the Chinese press was careful to demonstrate that India's apprehensions were not merely a reflection of Hindus' hatred for Pakistani Muslims, and that even Indian Muslims were also concerned at the possibility of US-Pakistan alliance. See, for example, NCNA, 14 March in SCMP, No.767, 16 March 1954, p.11; and NCNA, 13 April 1954, in SCMP, No.788, 4 April 1954, p.1

eastern and western wings of Pakistan were opposed to their government's role in advancing America's imperialist goals in Asia. The major points of criticism, emphasised by NCNA, were that the acceptance of US military aid would convert Pakistan into an American colony, make it a part of America's war plans and isolate it from Afro-Asian states. This opposition, the Chinese Government was careful to point out, was not restricted to Communist elements in Pakistan only and even conservative parties like the Jamiat-i-Islami considered that an alliance with America ran counter to Pakistan's national interest.³⁹ Since this opposition could have implications for the Muslim League's rule in the country, Beijing indirectly suggested, the Pakistan Government should respond to the public's demand and refrain from joining hands with the United States.⁴⁰

To state that Beijing advised Karachi against a military alliance with Washington by pointing out the global, regional and domestic implications of the decision is not to suggest that it completely refrained from expressing its displeasure. In fact, the Chinese Government did voice its disapproval privately to Pakistan's

³⁹For example, 'People the World Over Oppose US Building of Military Bases in Foreign Countries', op.cit., p.5; 'Pakistan Communist Party Warns Against US Aid', NCNA, 14 March 1954, in SCMP, No.767, March 1954, p.9-10; 'Pakistan M.P.s Denounce US Aid', NCNA, 22 March 1954, in SCMP, No.772, 23 March 1954, p.9; 'East Pakistan Peace Committee Opposed to the Pact', NCNA, 27 March 1954, in SCMP, No.776, 28 March 1954, p.4-5; and 'Opposition to US-Pakistan Pact Grows', NCNA, 30 March in SCMP, No.778, 31 March 1954, p.22.

⁴⁰This point was especially emphasized during the Muslim League's defeat in the East Pakistan elections of March 1954 and landslide victory of the United Front (215 out of 309 seats) which had opposed Pakistan's pact with the United States. On 7 April 1954, for instance, NCNA gave a detailed breakup of seats won by the parties in the election, pointed out that the elections were held at a stage when the US was intensifying its efforts to turn Pakistan into a military base, and then referred to a Pakistan Times report that the Muslim League's defeat was linked with the US-Pakistan military alliance. NCNA, 7 April 1954, in SCMP, No.784, 8 April pp.5-6.

Ambassador in February 1954.⁴¹ It also sent a message to the Indian National Convention held in New Delhi in May 1954, supporting its efforts against the US-Pakistan pact.⁴² Meanwhile it continuously demonstrated its non-acceptance of the Pakistan Government's claim that the pact with the United States did not involve granting of base rights by referring to western and Indian news media which reported construction of US air and military bases from Gilgit to Rawalpindi.⁴³ However, it is important to point out that throughout the December 1953 to mid-1954 period, when the Soviet Union openly warned Pakistan of the dire consequences of aligning with the United States, Beijing resisted voicing its opposition directly and overtly to Karachi's links with Washington.

The Chinese Government continued to pursue this restrained policy even as Pakistan proceeded to join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). From the very beginning, Beijing had opposed the idea of a regional alliance, denigrated it as a part of 'the US war policy' and had maintained that 'no self-respecting Asian country' would concede to join it.⁴⁴ Once the organisation was established on 8 September 1954, Beijing began to represent it as an illegal organisation. Article II and IV of the treaty, which provided for the military and war obligations of the signatories, were alleged to plunge the contracting parties into a state of constant

⁴¹G.W.Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh, and the Major Powers, (London: The Free Press, 1975), p. 160.

⁴²'China Peace Committee Greets Indian National Convention', NCNA, 7 May in SCMP, No.805, 11 May 1954, p.12.

⁴³See, for example, NCNA, 18 March 1954, in SCMP, No.770, 19 March 1954, p.10; NCNA, 3 May 1954, in SCMP, No.800, 4 May 1954, p.26; and NCNA, 23 May 1954, in SCMP, No.814, 22-24 May p.38.

⁴⁴See, for example, 'Kuang Ming Jih-pao Calls US "Economic Aid" a Dangerous Trap', NCNA, 21 August 1954, in SCMP, No.874, 23 August 1954, p.21.

preparation for war and enable the United States to use any pretext to launch a war or undertake encroachment, thus creating the possibility of involving all the members in war. The treaty, therefore, it was argued, was in direct contravention of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It was also accused of having violated the agreements reached at the Geneva Conference on the restoration of peace in Indo-China by extending the protective mantle of the treaty to Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam - the three Indo-Chinese states which had been debarred from joining any military alliance.⁴⁵ The Chinese press also depicted SEATO as a tool of American 'aggression' and imperialism. The organisation, it maintained, was chiefly directed against China, but it was also created to enable the United States to expand its market, enslave Asian peoples and crowd out traditional British and French influence.⁴⁶ Through SEATO, it was contended, the United States aimed at encroaching upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Southeast Asian nations, interfering in the internal affairs of other nations and infringing upon their rights and interests in the area, suppressing the struggle for independence of the Asian peoples, preparing for new aggressive war, undermining peace in Asia and increasing Asian tension.⁴⁷ To achieve these aims, it was argued,

⁴⁵ 'Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial Condemns Southeast Asia Bloc', NCNA, 13 September in SCMP, 14 September 1954, p.28.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.28.

⁴⁷ See, for example, 'Wu Min's Commentary: Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty: US Instrument of Aggression', NCNA, 10 September 1954, in SCMP, No.886, 11-13 September 1954, pp.31-32; 'Kuang Ming Jih-pao Editorial: SEATO Aggravates Asian Tensions', Ming Jih-pao Editorial: SEATO Aggravates Asian Tensions', NCNA, 15 September 1954, in SCMP, No.890, 17 September p.24; 'Hu Chin, Bangkok Conference Analysed: Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial', in NCNA, 23 February 1955, in SCMP, No.994, 24 February 1955, p.16 and 'US Schemes Behind Bangkok Conference - Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial', NCNA, 1 March 1955, in SCMP, 2 March 1955, p.1.

the United States intended to use as 'cannon fodder' the troops of SEATO's Asian members, whom it would organise 'as strategically placed reserves to be coordinated with the "mobile striking power" of American naval and air force'.⁴⁸ In brief, therefore, as before, Beijing continuously emphasised the US sinister motives behind the idea of establishing a military alliance and indirectly advised Pakistan, as well as other Asian members, against being exploited by the United States.

As before, Beijing also resorted to an indirect policy of emphasising local and regional opposition to Karachi's alliance with Washington to express its own displeasure with Pakistan's membership of SEATO. Before the Manila Conference, it provided an extensive and regular coverage of Indian, Pakistani and western news media to suggest that Pakistan was not a southeast Asian state but was a part of the subcontinent, and that it should refrain from attending the conference. To do otherwise, it pointed out, would further isolate Pakistan.⁴⁹ Even after the conference, the Chinese press reported editorials published in various local and regional newspapers to emphasise that Pakistan had made a wrong decision by joining SEATO. Membership of the defence alliance, it indicated, could have implications for the Pakistan Government itself as, under the Article 4 of the treaty, any power could interpret political reforms of a nation as constituting 'a threat' to other members and find a pretext

⁴⁸ 'Jen-min Jih-pao Analyses US Sponsored Bangkok Conference', NCNA, 13 January 1955, in SCMP, No.968, 14 January 1955, p.7; and 'SEATO Conference to enlist Asian Cannon-fodder: World Culture, February 1955', NCNA, 21 February 1955, in SCMP, No.991, 22-23 February p.28.

⁴⁹ See, for example, 'Pakistan Press Doubts SEATO Value', NCNA, 25 August 1954, in SCMP, 26 August 1954, p.6; and 'India Reported Opposed to SEATO', NCNA, 6 August 1954, in SCMP, No.864, 7-9 August 1954, p.2.

to intervene in its internal affairs.⁵⁰

While indirectly expressing its displeasure, however, Beijing published a number of articles in August 1954 which stressed the fact that Pakistan had avoided making any prior commitments to join SEATO, thereby demonstrating the Chinese government's realization that Pakistan's attitude towards the alliance was not unambiguous.⁵¹ More importantly, the Chinese Government began to stress the significance of friendly Sino-Pakistani relations. For the first time, since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai attended the Independence Day reception at the Pakistan Embassy on 14 August 1954 and not only expressed his Government's appreciation of Pakistan's concern for an armistice in Indo-China, but also emphasised that Pakistan and China could build and develop relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.⁵² In April 1955, at the Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai made a special effort to meet Pakistan's Prime Minister, Bogra (who had initially opposed the idea of inviting China to the conference) and discussed Karachi's membership of SEATO.⁵³ After these meetings he announced in a meeting of the political committee of the conference that he and

⁵⁰ See, for example, 'Nehru Denounces Southeast Asian Pact', NCNA, 10 September 1954, in SCMP, No.886, 11-13 September 1954, p.34-35; 'Pakistan Times Urges Government to Reject SEATO', NCNA, 17 September 1954, in SCMP, No.891, 18-20 September 1954, p.32-33; and NCNA, 7 January 1955, in SCMP, No.964, 8-10 January p.20.

⁵¹ See, for example, Chang Yin-huai, 'Commentary on Baguio SEATO Conference', Kuang Ming Jih Pao, 17 August transmitted by NCNA, 17 August 1954, in SCMP, No.871, 18 August 1954, p.11.

⁵² NCNA, 14 August 1954, in SCMP, No.869, 14-16 August 1954, p.22.

⁵³ According to Pakistan's first Ambassador to China, General Raza, he had proposed to have a dinner party at which Chou En-lai could meet Bogra at the Bandung Conference. Chou En-lai replied that Raza need not go to that trouble and that he would be happy to call on Bogra himself. Reported by Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), p.239, f.n.21.

the Pakistan Prime Minister had reached an understanding on matters of collective peace and cooperation. He also revealed that he had received an assurance from Bogra that Pakistan would not support any aggressive action that the United States might launch against China.⁵⁴ During this conference Chou En-lai also invited Bogra to visit China.

Following the Bogra-Chou meetings at Bandung, Chinese policy towards Pakistan underwent a slight change; Beijing continued to criticise SEATO,⁵⁵ but completely ceased referring to Indian opposition to Pakistan's membership of the military alliance. Instead Pakistan was now portrayed as a state which deserved sympathy and encouragement, and not criticism. Sympathy, because it had suffered economically due to its alliance with the United States,⁵⁶ and encouragement because it had demonstrated its will to take an independent line within SEATO itself.⁵⁷ Simultaneously, China began to pursue a policy of increased cultural and political contacts with Pakistan. Within a short period of four months, i.e. between December 1955 and March 1956, three prominent Chinese leaders, Health Minister, Mme Li Teh-Chuan, Vice-Chairman and Sun Yat-sen's widow, Mme Soong Ching-ling, and Vice-Premier Marshal Ho Lung visited

⁵⁴See the statement of Premier Chou En-lai to the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference on 23 April 1955, in Documents on International Affairs: 1955, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp.42-

⁵⁵See, for example, Shao Tsung-han, 'Jen-min Jih-pao Article on US Colonialism', NCNA, 22 May in SCMP, No.1053, 21-23 May 1954, p.28; and 'Expert in Kuang Ming Jih Pao Answers Imperialist Pretence Around NATO and SEATO', NCNA, 6 June 1955, in SCMP, No.1063, 7 June 1955, pp.4-5.

⁵⁶See, for example, Li Kao, 'So-called US "Aid" to Pakistan', Jen-min Jih-pao, 9 April 1955, in SCMP, No.1271, 19 April 1955, p.28.

⁵⁷For instance, Pakistan was praised for not participating in SEATO manoeuvres in February 1956. People's China, 16 March 1956, p.40-41.

Pakistan.⁵⁸ During these visits, the Chinese leaders emphasised that, in spite of different social and political systems, China and Pakistan could coexist and develop friendly relations. In a speech broadcast over Radio Pakistan Karachi on 29 January 1956, for instance, Mme Soong Ching-ling emphasised that historically mankind had lived in different systems, and that greed and rivalry for profit and not differences in social and political systems had been the main sources of war. The unanimous declaration of common efforts against another world war by the Afro-Asian states at Bandung, despite their diversity in social and political systems, she stated, was a proof that countries with entirely different systems could coexist. She stated that this coexistence was possible only if states respected each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and then proceeded to express her conviction that the friendship between Pakistan and China would and must be strengthened.⁵⁹ Two days later, speaking in Dacca, she underscored the significance of cultural exchanges between the two states and said that China and Pakistan would appreciate and realise that they had many common interests when they came into closer contacts and developed deeper understanding of each other.⁶⁰

These 'common interests' were identified in detail by Chinese Premier, Chou En-Lai during Pakistan's Prime Minister Suhrawardy's visit to Beijing in October 1956 - the first visit to China by a Pakistani head of the state. Speaking at a banquet in Suhrawardy's

⁵⁸ Marshal Ho Lung had attended the Inauguration of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on 23 March 1956 at such a short notice that later Pakistan's Foreign Minister identified it as a matter of special significance for Pakistan. J.P.Jain, op.cit., p.27.

⁵⁹ NCNA, 31 January 1956, in SCMP, No.1222, 5 February 1956, p.33.

⁶⁰ NCNA, 2 February in SCMP, No.1224, 7 February 1956, p.29 (emphasis added).

honour, Chou En-lai said: 'Our two countries do not have any conflicts of interest, but we do have many things in common. In the past we both suffered long from the perils of colonialism. Both our peoples eagerly desire to develop their national economy and get rid of the backwardness created by past colonial rule. The peoples of our two countries treasure ... their independence and sovereignty, and sympathize with other Asian and African peoples in their struggle against colonialism'.⁶¹ He then reiterated the theme that in spite of differences in Sino-Pakistani social systems and their 'views in regard to certain international questions', there was a wide prospect for further development of friendly relations and cooperation in various fields between the two states.⁶² This friendship, he stressed, was not only beneficial to the two states but also to the solidarity of Asian and African countries and to peace in Asia and the world.⁶³

These themes were repeated by Chou En-lai when he visited Pakistan two months later. There were, however, two new additions: the relations between China and Pakistan were described as dating back a number of centuries, and the colonialists were blamed for obstructing these contacts in recent history. Secondly, and more importantly, it was stressed that the Chinese Government was intent on continuing its friendly relations with Pakistan in spite of the 'colonialists' (US) attempts to drive a wedge between the two states

⁶¹ NCNA, 19 October 1956, in SCMP, No.1395, 23 October 1956, p.37 (emphasis added).

⁶² Ibid., p.38.

⁶³ Ibid., ... It is important to point out that this reference to significance of Sino-Pakistan relations for peace in Asia and the world was a new theme which the Chinese Government had begun to emphasise only after the Chou-Bogra talks. For the first time, while receiving Sultanuddin Ahmed, Pakistan's new Ambassador to China's credentials, Mao had referred to this theme. NCNA, 27 April in SCMP, No.1036, 28 April 1955, p.32.

by drawing Pakistan into the western alliance system.⁶⁴

The Chinese policy of stressing its interest in developing and maintaining friendly relations with Karachi continued even in the face of Pakistan's anti-China policies of the later half of the 1950s. In 1957, for instance, Suhrawardy visited the United States and joined Dulles in criticising China. The same year, Pakistan's United Nations delegation, after abstaining from voting on the issue of China's representation, changed its position and supported the American demand for postponing consideration of the issue. The next year, during the Taiwan crisis, when asked by the Chinese Government to clarify its position on Taiwan, Pakistan maintained that the status of the island was undecided, thereby refusing to endorse Beijing's claim to it. In 1959, during the Tibetan crisis, Pakistan not only condemned China but also voted in favour of placing the issue before the UN General Assembly. Ayub Khan also offered India to make arrangements for joint defence against 'the threat from the north'. The same year Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Manzoor Qadir, received a Taiwanese Muslims Hajj delegation.⁶⁵ The Chinese Government reacted to these anti-China policies but, while protesting, continued to express its interest in maintaining friendly relations with Pakistan. In June 1957, for instance, during his meeting with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, Liu Shao-chi reiterated that the two countries could coexist in spite of their different social and political systems. While criticizing Suhrawardy's anti-China statements in the US, the Chinese press expressed the hope that Suhrawardy would honour the joint statement issued at the end of

⁶⁴NCNA, 21 December 1956, in SCMP, No.1439, 28 December 1956, pp.14-16

⁶⁵Syed, op.cit., pp.72-78.

Chou's visit to Pakistan which reaffirmed Sino-Pakistani readiness to promote Afro-Asian solidarity. Similarly, while issuing its strongest denunciation of Pakistan's policies since 1951 after Manzoor Qadir's meeting with the Taiwanese Muslims, the Chinese Government reiterated its interest in preventing any further deterioration in Sino-Pakistani relations and expressed the hope that Karachi would 'pull the horse up before the precipice'.⁶⁶

Conclusion

Chinese policy in the 1950s can be summarised as follows:

After initially remaining indifferent to Pakistan's favourable overtures, the Chinese Government, adopted a 'correct' policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan's membership of the Western alliance system was rarely subjected to direct criticism. In fact, whenever provided opportunities such as the Bandung Conference, the Chinese leaders were keen to indicate their understanding of the factors compelling Pakistan to join the Western alliance system, and emphasised that there existed a common ground on which the two countries could meet and improve relations. For reasons that will be discussed in Chapter IX, this attitude prevailed even in the face of occasional Pakistani 'anti-China moves'. The Chinese Government and media were careful to indicate that China was still interested in improving relations with its southwestern neighbour.

⁶⁶ James D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp.155-157.

CHAPTER II

CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN DURING THE 1960 - 68 PERIOD

This chapter traces the course of Chinese relations with Pakistan during the 1960-68 period, and attempts to describe how, after initially keeping its options open vis-a-vis Islamabad, the Chinese Government consistently pursued a policy of maintaining friendly relations with Pakistan.

Keeping the Options Open

After continuously cultivating Pakistan's public opinion and maintaining a 'correct' relationship with the Pakistan Government during the 1950s, the Chinese Government proceeded to establish friendly relations with Pakistan during the 1960s. This transition from 'correct' to friendly relations, however, did not take place at the very outset of the 1960s. For the first two years of the decade, Beijing kept its options open vis-a-vis Islamabad. This was done, firstly by refraining from criticising the Pakistan Government's foreign policy orientation. In May 1960, for instance, when an American U-2 plane which had flown from Peshawar on a reconnaissance mission was shot down deep inside Soviet territory, Beijing joined Moscow in denouncing the US provocation. Speaking at a rally in Beijing, Kuo Mo-jo, Chairman of the World Peace Committee warned that if US imperialism continued to mistake Sino-Soviet 'desire for peace as a sign of weakness' and dared to continue its provocation, it could be assured that it could 'not escape its doom of being destroyed by the fire it played with'.¹ However, unlike Moscow which had warned Karachi against allowing its territory to be used by the US Air Force 'for the Commission of aggressive actions against USSR'

¹Asian Recorder: 1960, p. 3398; See also, 'All-Out Support for the Soviet Struggle Against US Aggression and Provocation: Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping's Speech at Peking Mass Rally', Peking Review, No. 21, 24 May 1960, pp. 6-7.

and had threatened to take 'retaliatory measures',² Beijing totally refrained from criticising Islamabad for its role in the incident, and from warning it against repeating such actions in future.³

Secondly, Beijing ignored various anti-China statements issued by Pakistani leaders. In May 1960, for example, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Manzoor Qadir, stated in a television interview that 'expansionist tendencies were more noticeable in China than in Russia' and these would not be mitigated by the PRC's admission to the United Nations.⁴ This was followed, four months later, by Z. A. Bhutto's allegations that China had made 'incursions' into Kashmir. Next year in July, President Ayub Khan, during his visit to the United States, once again referred (as he had soon after the Sino-Indian border dispute was made public in 1959) to the 'danger from the north' and stressed the need for joint Indo-Pakistan efforts to combat it.⁵ Also, in a 'Meet the Press' interview on 16 July 1961, he implicitly supported a 'two-China' policy by suggesting that a formula for accommodating both Taiwan and the PRC in the United Nations might be found.⁶ Unlike in 1959, when Pakistan's similar advocacy of a joint defence against China and implied support for Taiwan had evoked Chinese condemnation, the Chinese Government not only desisted from protesting officially but also avoided commenting on these statements in its press.

²Asian Recorder: 1960, pp. 3376-3377.

³Though Islamabad did not become Pakistan's capital until 1964, in order to avoid confusion, Pakistan's capital is identified as Islamabad and not as Karachi or Rawalpindi.

⁴Government of Pakistan, Handout E. No. 2741, 31 May 1960, cited by S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 216.

⁵Pakistan Times, 22 October 1960.

⁶Cited by Anwar Hussain Syed, China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), p. 83.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the Chinese Government kept its options for improving relations with Pakistan open by maintaining a non-committal attitude on the issue of demarcating the Sino-Pakistani boundary. In September 1959, the Pakistan Government had received certain Chinese maps which showed parts of Hunza as Chinese territory. The Sino-Pakistan border, for example, was shown as starting at Mintaka Pass, below the point where the Afghanistan-Pakistan boundaries actually met. Certain significant passes controlling access routes between Xinjiang and the Pakistan administered territories of the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan, such as the Kilik and Shimshal passes, were also included in Chinese territory.⁷ Although the Pakistan Government had maintained that it would take no official notice of these maps as they, by themselves, did not constitute a violation of territory its actions suggested that the maps did engage its serious concern.⁸ On 2 October 1959, the Governor of West Pakistan made a personal tour of Gilgit, the first ever visit by a provincial Governor to that area, to assess the developmental possibilities of the region and made an aerial survey of a proposed all-weather road connecting Gilgit with West Pakistan.⁹ This was followed by Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Manzoor Qadir's visit to Gilgit for talks with the military authorities there on the border situation.¹⁰ Meanwhile the Pakistan Foreign Office began collecting 'authentic, and internationally acceptable material to have a clear line demarcated between Pakistan and China' and was

⁷ Ibid. , pp. 82-83; and Dawn, 1 October 1959; see also, Khalida Qureshi, 'Pakistan and the Sino-Indian Dispute... I', Pakistan Horizon, vol. xv, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1962, pp. 320-321.

⁸ Syed, op. cit. , p. 83.

⁹ Dawn, 3 October 1959.

¹⁰ J. P. Jain, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974), p. 47.

setting up a cell to study the available data and examine the Chinese maps with a view to evolving a satisfactory alignment of the border.¹¹ On 23 October 1959, President Ayub announced his Government's intention to 'approach China for a peaceful settlement of the border question by demarcating the northern frontiers',¹² within a month a proposal to this effect was sent to China.¹³

The Chinese Government reacted to these moves with a studied silence. The Chinese news media made no mention of them, and refrained from commenting on or even reporting the news or rumours about informal contacts between the two states about demarcation of the border. Neither did Beijing respond to Pakistan's proposal for a peaceful settlement of the boundary question. It was only in the course of official level talks with India to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute, held in mid-June 1960, that the Chinese Government indirectly hinted at the possibility of demarcating its border with Pakistan by refusing to negotiate with India the boundary between Xinjiang and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.¹⁴ However, soon afterwards, when once again contacted by the Pakistan Government to negotiate the boundary agreement, the Chinese Government, instead of categorically accepting or refusing the proposal, responded by requesting time to consider the matter.¹⁵ It adopted a similar attitude the next year. In March 1961, the Pakistan Government sent a formal note to China proposing border negotiations, to which Beijing responded, as late as October 1961, that it was examining

¹¹ Pakistan Times, 15 October 1959.

¹² Pakistan Times, 24 October 1959.

¹³ Dawn, 24 November 1959.

¹⁴ Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia: China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR, (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 132.

¹⁵ Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Manzoor Qadir's interview to the correspondent of Hindustan Times, 10 March 1961.

Karachi's proposals and that it would inform the Pakistan Government of its intentions as soon as it was ready to conclude a boundary agreement.¹⁶

Cautious Move To Friendship

This non-committal attitude changed during early 1962. In an official note on 27 February 1962, the Chinese Government conveyed its willingness to conclude a boundary agreement with Pakistan. The boundary between the two states, it stated, was an undelimited one and had been 'left over by history'. To prevent the tranquility on this border from being adversely affected on account of misunderstanding, it continued, Beijing was prepared to attain with the Government of Pakistan 'an agreement of a provisional nature on the location and alignment now actually existing between the two countries'.¹⁷

Simultaneously, the Chinese Government began to express a public interest in establishing friendly relations with Pakistan. For the first time in the history of Sino-Pakistan relations, the China-Pakistan Friendship Association celebrated Pakistan's National Day in Beijing on 22 March 1962, and the Chinese speakers expressed their wish that the friendship between the people of the two countries would grow with each passing day.¹⁸ On the same day, Chairman Liu Shao-chi sent a message of congratulations to President Ayub in which he, unlike in the National Day Congratulatory messages of 1960 and 1961, not only repeated the wish of prosperity and well-being for Pakistan and its people but also added 'May the friendly relations between China and Pakistan be further

¹⁶Pakistan Times, 4 October 1961.

¹⁷Cited by J. P. Jain, op.cit., pp. 53-53.

¹⁸NCNA, 22 March 1961, in SCMP, No. 2707, 28 March 1962, p. 31.

developed'.¹⁹ The next day, the Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, speaking at the National Day reception given by the Pakistan Embassy went beyond the 1960-61 formula of proposing a toast to the 'friendship between the peoples of China and Pakistan, to the prosperity of the state of Pakistan and happiness of its people, to peace in Asia and the world'.²⁰ Instead, he emphasised that the Chinese and Pakistani people had always lived in peace, that the two states had suffered from imperialist exploitation; that both China and Pakistan had participated in the Bandung Conference and that promotion of their relations would not only be in the interests of peoples of China and Pakistan but would also consolidate Asian and world peace. More significantly, he declared that 'the Chinese Government would continue to work for the promotion of friendly relations between China and Pakistan'.²¹ As another evidence of Beijing's policy of establishing friendly relations with Islamabad, NCNA, in marked contrast to the previous two years, gave a detailed report of the speeches made at the reception.²²

It is worth noting, however, that initially Beijing moved very cautiously from a correct to a friendly policy towards Pakistan. The Chinese Government, for instance, did not express its willingness to conduct boundary negotiations with Pakistan until it was convinced in December 1961 that Ayub's regime had actually changed its nine years'

¹⁹NCNA, 22 March 1962, in SCMP, No. 2707, 28 March 1962, p. 31 (emphasis added); for National Day Congratulatory Messages of 1960 and 1961, see, NCNA, 22 March 1960, in SCMP, No. 2226, March 1960, p. 47; and NCNA, 22 March 1961, in SCMP, No. 2465, March 1961, p. 26.

²⁰NCNA, 23 March 1960, in SCMP, No. 2226, 29 March 1960, p. 47; and NCNA, 23 March 1961, in SCMP, No. 2466, March 1961, p. 29.

²¹NCNA, 23 March 1962, in SCMP, No. 2708, March 1962, p. 32 (emphasis added).

²²In 1961, for instance, only 19 lines were devoted to the Pakistan National Day reception in Beijing, whereas in 1962, the number increased to 49.

old policy of favouring the US resolution barring China's admission to the United Nations, and was prepared to vote in favour of Beijing's claim to the China seat in the international organisation.²³ Neither did the NCNA report Beijing's intentions of demarcating its boundary with Pakistan until 3 May 1962 when both the Chinese and Pakistani Governments simultaneously announced their decision to define the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the 'contiguous areas the defense of which is under actual control of Pakistan'.²⁴ Moreover, though the Chinese news media did increase the frequency of its coverage of developments in Pakistan, the total number of news items on Pakistan broadcast by the NCNA during 1962 did not exceed those reported in 1956 --- a year of relatively maximum cordiality during the 1950s.²⁵

This caution, it seems, resulted firstly from Beijing's interest in gauging the extent to which Pakistan was willing, against US wishes, to improve relations with China, and secondly from its interest in not undermining the Sino-Indian border negotiations that were underway at that time. The outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war in late 1962, however, changed the situation. Pakistan not only

²³ Since 1953, in deference to the US wishes, the Pakistani Government had voted, with one exception in 1957, for the deferment of the resolution concerning Communist China's admission to the United Nations. Beginning in 1961, the Pakistan Government had begun to express its willingness to support the proposition that the Chinese entry to the international organisation should be decided on the basis of a simple and not a two-thirds majority, and in the UN General Assembly session held in December 1961, it had actually voted in favour of Beijing's claim to the China seat in the UN.

²⁴ NCNA, 3 May 1962, in SCMP, No. 2734, 9 May 1962, p. 33.

²⁵ The total number of news items on Pakistan broadcast by the NCNA in 1956 was 76 compared to 9 in 1961 and 39 in 1962. Survey of China Mainland Press Index: 1961, (Hereafter cited as SCMP Index: 1961, SCMP Index 1962, and personal computation for 1956

Supported the Chinese version of the border incident,²⁶ but also refused President Kennedy's request to give Nehru assurances of a kind which would enable him to deploy more Indian troops against China.²⁷ Soon afterwards, the Chinese Government, which had taken eleven months to reply formally to Pakistan's note on boundary settlement and eight months to start actual talks in October 1962, accelerated the pace of negotiations. Within about two months it announced, on 27 December 1962, a 'complete agreement in principle' on aligning the Sino-Pakistan boundary.²⁸

Consolidation of a Friendship

The terms of the boundary agreement, signed on 2 March 1963, reflected the Chinese Government's policy of consolidating its newly established friendship with Pakistan. Out of the total 3,400 square miles of disputed territory, Beijing agreed to cede to Pakistan 1,350 square miles 750 square miles of which had been actually occupied and administered by China. This territory, brought the Pakistanis of Hunza some modest economic advantages. The Pakistan Government, on the other hand, was not asked to make a similar gesture and had to give up claims over 2,050 square miles of territory on maps only.²⁹

²⁶Bhutto, for instance, described the Chinese attack on India as 'illusory aggression' and declared that there was no possibility of Pakistan's coming to help India in its fight with China. President Ayub also told the National Assembly, which had been summoned into an emergency session on 21 November 1961, that Indian and not Chinese conduct had precipitated the Sino-Indian border war. Cited by J. P. Jain, op. cit., pp. 59-61.

²⁷Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: a Political Autobiography, (London: O.U.P., 1967), pp. 142-143.

²⁸NCNA, 27 December 1962, in SCMP, No. 2889, 2 January, 1963, p. 40.

²⁹Syed, op. cit., pp. 87-89

The boundary agreement in principle was followed, within a period of eight months by two more agreements between the two states. First on 5 January 1963, China and Pakistan concluded a trade agreement which guaranteed most-favoured-nation treatment on a bilateral basis in matters of commerce and trade including shipping. The agreement, the first of its kind between the two countries, also provided for the conclusion of arrangements between the two states to facilitate the expansion of trade between them. Under the agreement, China consented to export metal and steel products, coal cement, machinery, chemicals, raw materials and cereals. Pakistan, on the other hand, was to export jute and jute manufactures, cotton and cotton textiles, leather, sports goods, surgical instruments, chrome ore and newsprint. However, more importantly the two sides agreed that exchange of commodities not specified in the list could also take place, thereby indicating their willingness to further expand, if necessary, the scope of the Sino-Pakistan economic interaction.³⁰

Seven months later, on 29 August 1963, China and Pakistan concluded an air-travel agreement, which entitled airlines of the two countries to operate over each other's territories and provided for all facilities necessary to ensure a smooth flow of traffic at all specified points in their territories.³¹ This agreement generated considerable interest in the international community as it was the first of its kind that China had concluded with a non-communist state. Since Moscow's decision in October 1955 to allow, for the first time, a non-communist airline - the National Airline of Finland

³⁰NCNA, 5 January 1963, in SCMP, No. 2895, 10 January 1963, p. 30.

³¹Dawn, 30 August 1963.

- to operate in the USSR, the British, Scandinavian and Japanese airlines had been trying to gain access to the other major communist state i.e., the Chinese mainland. These efforts had been continuously rebuffed by the Chinese Government which refused to permit any non-communist carrier to operate in its territory. However, when approached by Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), which after losing money on its Trans-Atlantic service was exploring the possibilities of extending its lines to the Far East, Beijing immediately consented to its operation via Canton and Shanghai for a regular air-service between Karachi, Dacca and Tokyo. The Chinese authorities also expressed their willingness to complete in 'record time' the extension of runways at Shanghai and Canton airports necessary for the Boeing 720-B jetliners of PIA. More importantly, Beijing permitted PIA to operate in China without any conditions regarding the nationality of passengers carried into or transiting the country.³²

Simultaneous with the conclusion of boundary, trade and air travel agreements, the Chinese Government increased the frequency of contacts with the governmental, professional and intellectual elites of Pakistan. The total number of delegations exchanged between the two states, for instance, increased from 3 in 1962 to 15 in 1963. This was accompanied by a marked increase in the frequency of the Chinese news media's coverage of events and developments in Pakistan. In the first eight months of 1963, for example, the NCNA broadcast 64 news items directly related to Pakistan compared to only 14 during the same period of the previous year.

In these news items, and during the exchange of visits, the Chinese Government highlighted certain themes: firstly, it was

³²Syed, op. cit., pp. 94-96.

emphasised that the conclusion of boundary, trade and air travel accords had ushered Sino-Pakistan relations into a new stage of extreme closeness and cordiality. The Pakistan Government, it was underscored, had been subjected to pressure by 'the imperialists and their followers' in a bid to restrain it from improving its relations with China. Due to larger consideration of international peace and security, however, Islamabad had refused to succumb to this pressure and, acting wisely and boldly, had proceeded to conclude various agreements with Beijing. The Chinese Government, it was pointed out, appreciated Pakistan's resoluteness and, on its part, was equally determined 'to exert efforts to continuously strengthen the friendly relations ... [between] the two countries'.³³

Secondly, it was emphasised that the Sino-Pakistan cordiality was not restricted to governmental level only. The improvement in the relationship, it was frequently pointed out, had been brought about as a result of 'the joint efforts of the governments and peoples of China and Pakistan',³⁴ and that these peoples shared a common desire to continuously strengthen their friendly relations³⁵

Thirdly, it was stressed that the friendship between the peoples of the two countries was not a new phenomenon, and that it dated as far back as 2,000 years. Trade and economic contacts and exchanges in art and culture between China and both East and West Pakistan, it was emphasised, had been continuously developing since the First Kushan

³³See, for instance, 'Beijing Rally Celebrates Signing of Boundary Agreement Between China and Pakistan', NCNA, 2 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, 7 March 1963, p. 30. *Pakistani Foreign Minister Gives Banquet Honouring Chinese Leaders', NCNA, 2 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, 7 March 1963, p. 35.

³⁴See, for example, NCNA, 3 January 1963, in SCMP, No. 2894, 9 January 1963, p. 43, (emphasis added).

³⁵See, for instance, Peng Chen, Mayor of Beijing's speech. NCNA, 2 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, March 1963, p. 31.

Empire (1st - 3rd centuries A.D.).³⁶ These cultural and commercial contacts, which grew even closer during the Mughal Empire, were interrupted in the modern times due to 'the aggression and oppression of imperialism and colonialism'. However, since China's liberation and Pakistan's independence, it was maintained, the peoples of the two countries had resumed their friendship in the direction indicated by the history.³⁷

Fourthly, it was consistently emphasised that the friendly relations between the two countries were being strengthened 'under the guidance of the Bandung Spirit'. In their mutual relations, it was emphasised, China and Pakistan adhered to the five principles of peaceful co-existence, i.e. mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and settlement of various issues through friendly negotiations. This, it was pointed out, was not only in accord with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Pakistani people but was also conducive to Asian-African solidarity and world peace.³⁸

Finally, the Chinese leaders and news media continuously maintained that China's closeness to Pakistan was a permanent, and not a temporary, phenomenon. The Chinese Government and people, it was frequently emphasised, were to 'always remain a true friend of

³⁶ Dawn, 17 April 1963; Dawn, 22 April 1963; Lio Cheng-chu and Chen Jui-yu, 'China-Pakistan Friendship Popular Among Pakistan People', NCNA, 18 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3165, 25 February 1964, pp. 30-31; and NCNA, 25 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3169, 2 March 1964, p. 28.

³⁷ See, for example, NCNA, 24 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3167, 27 February 1964, p. 37.

³⁸ See, for example, NCNA, 20 February 1964, in SCMP, 3166, 26 February 1964, p. 33. It is interesting to note that although these principles were first enunciated by Chou En-lai and Nehru in 1954, the Chinese Government always identified them as part of the ten principles of the Bandung Conference.

... [their Pakistani counterparts] in their struggle to safeguard their national independence, oppose foreign pressure and build their country'.³⁹ No one, it was continuously stressed, could undermine this friendship.⁴⁰

Such direct references to the permanence of its relations with Islamabad were supplemented with Beijing's policy of indirectly emphasising the durability of the Sino-Pakistan friendship. The Chinese news media occasionally reported, without comments, statements by various Pakistani leaders suggesting that the scope of Sino-Pakistani relations could be further expanded. On 1st March 1963, for instance, the NCNA reported Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto's statement that his visit to China would lead to a growing understanding between Pakistan and China, and would 'constitute the basis for future cooperation in as many fields of [Pakistan's] ... national activity as possible'.⁴¹

More importantly, however, the indirect emphasis on the durability of the Sino-Pakistan links took the form of not refuting the statements issued by the various Pakistani leaders suggesting a high degree of Chinese commitment to Pakistan's security. On 17 July 1963, for instance, Bhutto, declared in the National Assembly that if India were to attack Pakistan, the international situation being what it was, Pakistan would not be alone. 'An attack by India on Pakistan', he said, 'would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia'. This was followed, three

³⁹ See, for instance, Peng Chen, Mayor of Beijing's Speech in NCNA, 1 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, 7 March 1963, p. 31, (emphasis added).

⁴⁰ See, for example, Chen Yi's speech, NCNA, 1 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2932, 6 March 1963; and NCNA, 21 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3166, 26 February 1964, p. 35.

⁴¹ NCNA, 1 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2932, 6 March 1963, p. 27 (emphasis added).

days later by President Ayub's remarks that Pakistan would seek Chinese protection if the Western countries continued their assistance to India.⁴² These and other similar statements⁴³ caused a stir in Pakistan and abroad leading to speculations that China and Pakistan might have concluded an alliance. They were, however, neither reported nor commented upon by the NCNA which otherwise provided an extensive coverage of Pakistani government and public view of the Sino-Pakistani friendship. Nevertheless, by not refuting these statements the Chinese Government gave them some credibility and made the outside world, especially the Indians, assume that China had consented, at least tacitly, to assist Pakistan if it was subjected to aggression.⁴⁴

While highlighting, both directly and indirectly, the durability of its relations with Islamabad, Beijing also began to project Pakistan as a progressive state. Unlike in the 1950s, it was no longer identified as a state which was pursuing an 'extremely doubtful' policy of 'obtaining so-called "aid" from the United States at the expense of compromising the fate of its people'. Neither was it singled out as an example of the states which, in the process of receiving 'aid' from the United States, had failed to proceed with any large scale economic construction and had brought about the

⁴²Pakistan Times, 18 and 21 July 1963.

⁴³In September 1963, for instance, in an interview to Selig Harrison, President Ayub said that if Pakistan was attacked by India, it would mean that India was on the move and wanted to expand. 'We assume', he said, 'that other Asiatic powers, especially China, would take notice of that'. Washington Post, 12 September 1963.

⁴⁴See, for example, an Indian author's view in B. L. Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House) , 1968, p. 103.

deterioration of their financial and economic situation.⁴⁵ Instead, Pakistan was identified as a state which had come to see that the economic development of a country depended mainly on its own efforts and not on foreign aid.⁴⁶ Therefore, it was determined to advance along an independent path of economic development.⁴⁷ Replying on its own resources, it was stressed Pakistan had already made much progress in such fields as light industry, water conservancy works, agricultural production and city construction.⁴⁸ Pakistan's foreign policy orientation, it was emphasised, had also undergone a change. It was no longer portrayed as pursuing a policy of increasing dependence on and trailing behind the United States.⁴⁹ Instead, Pakistan was categorised as one of the states which had 'deserted' the United States,⁵⁰ and which had waged unremitting struggles to safeguard its independence and sovereignty. It was also identified as a state which was 'playing an important role in upholding international justice and world peace'. While waging a struggle to

⁴⁵See, for example, Tsui Chi, 'SEATO is Colonialism in New Form', Jen-min Jih-pao, 16 March 1956, in SCMP, No. 1255, 26 March 1956, pp. 27-28; Li Kao, 'So-called US "Aid" to Pakistan', Jen-min Jih-pao, 9 April 1956, in SCMP, No. 1271, 15 April 1956, pp. 28-29; and 'Kuang-ming Jih-pao on Projected US-Pakistan Military Pact', NCNA, 18 January 1959, in SCMP, No. 1938, 21 January 1959, p. 40.

⁴⁶Chou En-lai's interview with the correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan on 31 March 1963, Dawn, 11 April 1963.

⁴⁷See, for instance, NCNA, 2 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, 7 March 1963, p. 30; 'Premier Chou En-lai Speaks at Civic Reception in Karachi', NCNA, 18 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3165, 25 February 1964, p. 34; and Yeh Chi-chiang, Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade's speech during Wahiduzzaman's visit to China, NCNA, 15 July 1964, in SCMP, No. 3261, 20 July 1964, p. 29.

⁴⁸See, for example, 'Premier Chou En-lai Speaks at State Banquet Given by Pakistan's President', NCNA, 20 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3166, 26 February 1964, p. 32.

⁴⁹See, for example, 'Chinese Papers Warn Pakistan', NCNA, 23 July 1959, in SCMP, No. 2064, 28 July 1959, pp. 41-42.

⁵⁰See, for example, 'US China Policy in Blind Alley: Says Jen-min Jih-pao Observer', NCNA, 19 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3165, 25 February 1964, p. 43.

preserve its own sovereignty, the Chinese Government and news media frequently pointed out, the Pakistan Government and peoples had also supported and encouraged other states pursuing similar goals. Pakistan, for instance, it was maintained, had explicitly opposed the scheme to create 'two Chinas' and in defiance of outside pressure, had voted for the restoration to China of its lawful seat in the United Nations. Moreover, the Pakistan Government was also commended for breaking out of the isolation of the 1950s and making 'valuable efforts and contributions towards the strengthening of its contacts and friendship with Asian and African countries and the promotion of Asian-African solidarity'. Such attempts, especially its call for the holding of a Second Afro-Asian conference were said to have won Pakistan the praise of the Asian-African people, and to have contributed to the ever increasing prestige for Pakistan at the international level.⁵¹

Simultaneously, the Chinese Government also began to evince an interest in financing Pakistan's economic development projects. During his visit in January 1963, the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Trade, Lin Haiyun, communicated to the Pakistan Government Beijing's willingness to extend technical assistance and long-term credit to set up small and medium sized industries.⁵² The actual offer, however, was not made till July 1964 when China pledged a loan amounting to US\$60 million to finance Pakistan's Third Five-Year Plan. Half of this loan was earmarked for import of commodities like coal, cement, iron and steel, and electrical equipment from China.

⁵¹See, for instance, NCNA, 20 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3166, 26 February 1964, p. 33; NCNA, 24 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3167, 27 February 1964, p. 38; and NCNA, 2 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, 7 March 1963, p. 35.

⁵²Asian Recorder: 1963, p. 5047.

The other half was to be utilised for financing various industrial projects including a heavy machinery complex in West Pakistan and a paper pulp complex in East Pakistan.⁵³ Though comprising only 2.96% of all the loans contracted during the Second Five-Year Plan, and 10.81% of all the loans pledged to Pakistan during 1964-65, this credit was of special significance. Firstly, unlike those extended by the United States and the Soviet Union, which had an interest rate of 0.75% - 2.5% and 2.5% to 3% respectively, this loan was interest free. Secondly, it was repayable through the export of Pakistani primary commodities and manufactured goods and not in the form of hard currency during a period of ten to twenty years starting in 1976.⁵⁴ Thirdly, it made Pakistan one of only five Afro-Asian states which had received Chinese aid commitments in amounts exceeding US\$50 million during the 1956-64 period, the other four being Algeria, Burma, Indonesia and The United Arab Republics.⁵⁵

Of even greater significance, however, was the Chinese political support for Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. Since the early 1950s, the Chinese Government had maintained, like the Soviet Government⁵⁶ that the Kashmir issue had been created by the US and British

⁵³ Pakistan Economic Survey: 1966-67, (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1967), p. 215.

⁵⁴ Pakistan Economic Survey: 1964-65, (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 1965), pp. 198-204; Pakistan Economic Survey: 1965-66, (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 1966), p. 196; and Pakistan Economic Survey: 1970-71, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 1971), pp. 78-79.

⁵⁵ Milton Kovner, 'Communist China's Foreign Aid to Less Developed Countries', An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Vol. 2, Studies Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 90th Congress, 1st session, February 1967, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 612-613.

⁵⁶ See, for instance, 'Statement by the Soviet Representative Malik in the UN Security Council, 17 January 1952', in R. K. Jain, Soviet-South Asian Relations: 1947-1978, Vol. 1, (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Company, 1979), pp. 4-9.

imperialists. It had also maintained that the settlement of the issue had been impeded by the interventionist policies of the imperialists who wanted to transform Kashmir into a US colony and military base. Taking advantage of the Kashmir issue, the Chinese had alleged the imperialists had sown discord, estranged and even provoked armed conflict between India and Pakistan with the object of weakening them and compelling them to ask for foreign aid. This is why, it was argued, a tense situation had existed on the borders of the two countries ever since their separation. The United Nations, it was pointed out, had failed to ease this situation. Instead, as a result of US and British intervention, it had further complicated the issue by persistently proposing arbitration or stationing of observers in Kashmir to carry through plebiscite. Thus the most logical approach to settle the issue, Beijing had maintained, was to adopt the method of direct negotiations between India and Pakistan, leaving the foreign 'arbitrators' and 'observers' on one side.⁵⁷ In October 1952, therefore, Chinese Vice-Premier, Kuo Mo-jo, had supported the joint declaration issued by the Pakistani and Indian delegations to the Asian Pacific Peace Conference appealing to the people and the governments of the two countries to 'jointly strive for the creation of conditions which ... [could] enable the entire people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their future destiny freely without fear and outside interference'.⁵⁸ Later, in August 1953, the Chinese Government had expressed satisfaction at the Nehru Bogra

⁵⁷See, for instance, NCNA, 1 November 1952, in SCMP, No. 445, 3-4 November 1952, p. 16; and 'Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial on the India-Pakistan Talks', NCNA, 28 August 1953, in SCMP, No. 642, 29 August-1 September 1954, pp. 23-24.

⁵⁸NCNA, 1 November 1952, in SCMP, No. 445, 3-4 November 1952, p. 16 (emphasis added); see also, NCNA, 19 November 1952, in SCMP, No. 457, 21 November 1952, p. 8; and NCNA, 10 December 1952, in SCMP, No. 471, 12 December 1952, pp. 5-6.

talks held outside the ambit of the Security Council in July and August 1953 to settle the Kashmir dispute. The joint communique issued at the end of the talks, Beijing had maintained, showed that 'a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question as opposed to intervention and hindrance by foreign aggressive powers ...[had] become the common desire of the peoples and governments of India, Pakistan and Kashmir'.⁵⁹

This neutral Chinese stand on the Kashmir issue had not changed even after Pakistan's decision to join the Western alliance system. Unlike the Soviet Union which, after remaining neutral, had begun to support India's position,⁶⁰ the Chinese Government refrained from conceding that Kashmir belonged to India. During the 1954-55 period, for instance, while reporting India's opposition to the US-Pakistan alliance, the NCNA frequently referred to New Delhi's demand that the US military observers should be removed from Kashmir as their neutrality could no longer be guaranteed.⁶¹ However, at no stage did it report, or comment on, the Indian assertion that the US military assistance to Pakistan had 'produced a qualitative change in the existing situation (in Kashmir)' and that, therefore, India was under no obligation to abide by the Bogra-Nehru joint communique of August 1953.⁶² Neither did it report Khrushchev's statement in Srinagar on 10 December 1955 endorsing ^{the} Indian claim over Kashmir. Instead, it

⁵⁹'Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial on the India-Pakistan Talks', op.cit., p. 24 (emphasis added).

⁶⁰'Speech by N. S. Khrushchev at a Reception given by the Prime Minister of Kashmir in Srinagar, 10 December 1955', in R. K. Jain, op. cit., p. 17.

⁶¹See, for example, Nehru's statement in the Indian Parliament on 16 March 1954 in which he reiterated his view that American 'observers' of the United Nations in Kashmir could not be regarded as neutral. Reported by NCNA, 18 March 1954, in SCMP, No. 770, 19 March 1954, p. 9.

⁶²Burke, op. cit., p. 226.

continued to indicate that the Chinese Government still regarded Kashmir as a disputed territory and a distinct political entity which was neither a part of India nor of Pakistan. On March 7, 1954, for example, the NCNA clearly distinguished between the 'Government of Kashmir' and the 'Indian Government' while reporting the Premier of Kashmir, Bakshi Gulam Mohammed's support for Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha against the US-Pakistan pact.⁶³ Similarly, on 3 May 1954, in its resume of Indian reports of US bases in Pakistan, the NCNA distinguished the bases 'in Gilgit in Kashmir' from those 'in Chitral in Pakistan'.⁶⁴ The Chinese news media had also continued to point out that, as in the past, Beijing still deemed bilateral negotiations as the most appropriate method of settling the Kashmir issue. On 21 May 1955, for instance, a Kuang Ming Jih Pao commentary stated that it had been impossible in the past to settle the Kashmir issue because of the Western countries' intervention. That is why, it said, Indian and Pakistan patriots had advocated the settlement of the questions by means of negotiations between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers following the Afro-Asian Conference which had 'created a good starting point' in the direction of a bilateral settlement of the Kashmir dispute.⁵⁵

The Chinese Government had not wavered from its position during the second half of the 1950s either. In December 1956, for example, Chou En-lai was asked in a press conference in Calcutta if his reference to the Chinese support for India's struggle in defence of territorial integrity included Kashmir as well. Instead of replying

⁶³'Kashmir Premier Opposes US-Pakistan Pact', NCNA, 7 March 1954, in SCMP, No. 761, 6-8 March 1954, p. 22, (emphasis added).

⁶⁴NCNA, 3 May 1954, in SCMP, No. 800, 4 May 1954, p. 26.

⁶⁵'Kuang Ming Jih Pao on Indian-Pakistani Talks', NCNA, 21 May 1955, in SCMP, No. 1053, 21-23 May 1955, p. 14.

in the affirmative, the Chinese Premier reiterated his Government's stand that 'the Kashmir question was an outstanding question between India and Pakistan', and expressed the hope that it would be settled amicably. 'India and Pakistan', he said 'are sister countries. There can be no dispute between them which cannot be settled.'⁶⁶ A few days later, in Karachi, Chou En-lai admitted that he had discussed the Kashmir issue with both Suhrawardy and Nehru but expressed his Government's reluctance to help India and Pakistan solve the dispute through a conference on the grounds that 'it was still in the stage of studying [the]... question'.⁶⁷ The Kashmir issue, he reiterated, had to be settled between India and Pakistan through direct negotiations and emphasised that it was possible only if the 'American influence' was not allowed to create trouble in the issue.⁶⁸ Next year in February, during his visit to Ceylon, Chou En-lai joined his Ceylonese counterpart in appealing to both India and Pakistan to make further efforts for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute for the sake of their own interest as well s for the broader interests of Afro-Asian solidarity. He also advised against referring the issue to the United Nations which, due to its domination by the United States, was likely to heighten 'the danger of foreign intervention'.⁶⁹

This neutralist line was adhered to during the early 1960s as

⁶⁶ NCNA, 10 December 1956, in SCMP, No. 1430, 13 December 1956, p. 29.

⁶⁷ NCNA, 25 December 1956, in SCMP, No. 1440, 30 December 1956, p. 23.

⁶⁸ Asian Recorder: 1957, p. 1235.

⁶⁹ 'Sino-Ceylonese Joint Statement', NCNA, 5 February 1957, in SCMP, No. 1466, 8 February 1957, p. 30; and 'Chou En-lai's Report on Visits to Eleven Countries in Asia and Europe: Given to the Third Plenary Session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference: 5 March 1957', People's China, (Supplement) No. 7, 1 April 1957, p. 14.

well. In its note of 27 February 1962, for example, Beijing was careful to emphasise that its willingness to discuss the problem of border demarcation with Pakistan did not amount to denying the existence of the Kashmir dispute or accepting the legality of Pakistan's occupation of a part of Kashmir '... [p]ending settlement of the Kashmir dispute, it said, China was prepared to reach an agreement with Pakistan of a provisional nature on the location and alignment 'now actually existing between the two countries'.⁶⁰ Even in its press release of 3 May 1962 announcing the Sino-Pakistani agreement to discuss the boundary question, the Chinese Government was careful to emphasise that the negotiations were to lead to a provisional agreement which was to be replaced with a final agreement once the Kashmir dispute was settled.⁷¹ Later, while replying to an Indian protest note against the boundary agreement the Chinese Government maintained on 31 May 1962 that it had agreed to conduct the 'negotiations with Pakistan to settle the question of the actually existing common boundary ... [only in order] to maintain tranquility on the border and enmity between the two countries'. 'The negotiations', it stressed, 'did not at all involve the question of the ownership of Kashmir', as it was made crystal clear that after the settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the sovereign authorities concerned were to reopen negotiations with China and conclude a final border agreement. Neither did the negotiations, the Chinese government insisted, imply a change in its position on the Kashmir issue. 'With regard to the Kashmir dispute', it said, 'it has been the consistent position of the Chinese Government to be impartial and to wish that India and

⁷⁰ J. P. Jain, op. cit. , pp. 55-56 (emphasis added).

⁷¹ NCNA, 3 May 1962, in SCMP, No. 2734, 9 May 1962, p. 33.

Pakistan will reach a peaceful settlement. This has been and still is the Chinese position'.⁷² This line of argument was repeated by Beijing on 12 September 1962 in response to another Indian protest note of 30 June 1962.

Towards the end of 1962 and in early 1963, i.e. soon after the Sino-Indian border war, however, the Chinese Government began to exhibit signs of moving away from its neutral stance on the Kashmir dispute. While reciprocating Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ali's new year message in 1963, for instance, Chou En-lai described 'the agreement in principle on the border between the two countries' as fully reflecting 'the desire of the peoples of China and Pakistan for sincere friendship'.⁷³ This description was a departure from the previous Chinese policy of distinguishing Kashmir from Pakistan, and identifying the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement as the one arrived at demarcating 'the border between China's Xinjiang and the contiguous areas, the defence of which is the responsibility of Pakistan'.⁷⁴ This was followed, on 4 March 1963, by a veiled reference to 'the Chinese support for Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir issue in the joint communique' issued after the conclusion of the formal Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement. The eighth paragraph of the communique initially referred to the Pakistan Foreign Minister's statement that his Government had consistently worked and would

⁷²For text of the Indian note to China on 10 May 1962, see, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China, (White Paper), Vol. VI (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs), pp. 96-79; For Chinese reply, see, 'Chinese Foreign Ministry Rejects India's Protest Against Sino-Pakistani Boundary Negotiations', NCNA, 4 June 1962, in SCMP, No. 2755, 8 June 1962, p. 24 (emphasis added).

⁷³Dawn, 3 January 1963, (emphasis added).

⁷⁴See, for instance, 'China, Pakistan Issue Joint Communique', NCNA, 28 December 1962, in SCMP, No. 2890, 3 January 1963, pp. 43-44; and 'Jen-min Jih-pao Hails Sino-Pakistan Agreement on Boundary Question', NCNA, 29 December 1962, in Ibid, p. 44 (emphasis added).

continue to strive for an equitable and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute with India through peaceful negotiations. It then stated that the Chinese Government had expressed its appreciation of the attitude of the Pakistan Government in seeking a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute and was of the belief that expeditious settlement of the dispute would be conducive to peace in Asia and in the world.⁷⁵

In spite of these indications, Beijing continued to maintain that its position on the Kashmir dispute had not changed. On 21 February 1963, for instance, it denied India's allegation that the decision to announce the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement in principle on the eve of Indo-Pakistan talks on the Kashmir issue was a clear evidence of Beijing's desire to get involved in the dispute. 'Proceeding from the sincere desire to strengthen Asian-African solidarity', it said, 'China hopes as it has always hoped, that the two sister countries India and Pakistan will be able to solve their dispute, peacefully'.⁷⁶ Later, on 2 March 1963, the Chinese Foreign Minister underscored that China had all along maintained a position of not getting involved in the Kashmir dispute and had hoped that India and Pakistan would settle it bilaterally. The conclusion of the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement, he stressed, did not mean a deviation from this position as the Chinese attitude was 'open and above-board and consistent'.⁷⁷

However, beginning in 1964, the Chinese Government openly gave up its non-committal attitude over the Kashmir issue. During his state visit to Pakistan in February, 1964, Chou En-lai categorically

⁷⁵NCNA, 4 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, 7 March 1963, p. 33 (emphasis added).

⁷⁶R. K. Jain, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

⁷⁷NCNA, 2 March 1963, in SCMP, No. 2933, 7 March 1963, p. 35.

supported Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. The joint communique issued on his talks with President Ayub urged a solution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. It would be of no avail, it added, 'to deny the existence of,...(this) dispute and adopt a big-nation chauvinistic attitude of imposing one's will on others'.⁷⁸ The significance of this shift in Chinese support lay in its marked contrast to the directions in which Soviet and American policies on Kashmir moved.

Since the early 1950s, the Soviet Union had been more favorably disposed towards the Indian stand on the issue. It had, for instance, objected to the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 requiring India and Pakistan to submit their differences to arbitration on the grounds that it was unacceptable to India and, therefore, could not serve as the basis for settling the issue.⁷⁹ Later, in December 1955, as mentioned earlier, Khrushchev had categorically endorsed India's claim over the princely state. That Kashmir is one of the states of the Republic of India', he had stated in Srinagar, 'has been decided by the people in Kashmir. It is a question that the peoples themselves have decided'.⁸⁰ Thereafter, the Soviet Government had consistently identified Kashmir as an 'inalienable part of the Republic of India', and had supported India in all the Security Council meetings on the Kashmir dispute. On 24 January 1957, for instance, it objected to the Security Council resolution reaffirming the previous Council and UNCIP resolution that

⁷⁸ 'China-Pakistan Joint Communique', NCNA, 24 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3167, 27 February 1964, p. 36 (emphasis added).

⁷⁹ United Nations Security Council Official Records: Twelfth Year, 765th meeting, 24 January 1957, S/PV 765 and Corr. (New York: United Nations, 1957), pp. 16-17 (hereafter cited as S. C. O. R.).

⁸⁰ R. K. Jain, op. cit., p. 17.

the final disposition of Kashmir would be determined by a plebiscite under the UN auspices. The Security Council, it maintained, could not disregard the fact that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, which represented the Kashmiri people, had settled the Kashmir dispute by adopting the State Constitution on 17 November 1956 which declared Kashmir as an integral part of India.⁸¹ More importantly, the Soviet Union vetoed a resolution on 20 February 1957 which suggested stationing of UN forces in Kashmir in connection with the demilitarisation of, and holding of a plebiscite in, Kashmir. This resulted in the adoption of^a comparatively milder resolution on 21 February 1957 asking the current President of the Security Council to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which were likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute.⁸² In 1962, when the Kashmir issue was once again brought to the Security Council's attention by Pakistan, the Soviet Government reiterated that 'the question of Kashmir, which is one of the states of the Republic of India and forms an integral part of India', had been decided by the people of Kashmir itself. The matter was decided, it emphasised, in accordance with the principles of democracy and, therefore, the assertion that the people of Kashmir had not exercised their right to self-determination was 'groundless'. Significantly, this time the Soviet Union, by using its veto, prevented the Security Council from adopting any resolution, even one so mild as merely to urge both India and Pakistan to continue

⁸¹ S.C.O.R.: Twelfth Year, 765th meeting, 24 January 1957, pp. 16-17.

⁸² Ibid., 770th meeting, 18 February 1957, S/PV 770, pp. 38-39; Ibid., 773rd meeting, 20 February 1957, S/PV 773, p. 29; and Ibid., 774th meeting, 21 February 1957, S/PV 774, p. 14.

negotiating with each other.⁸³ Even during the Security Council deliberations on the Kashmir dispute in 1964 the Soviet Government asserted that the issue had been settled by the Kashmiri people themselves and supported the Indian Government's position that, under the then prevalent circumstances the passing of resolutions on the Kashmir question by the Security Council would aggravate rather than improve matters.⁸⁴

The United States, with which Pakistan had concluded military pacts primarily with the aim of eliciting its support against India, had been more forthcoming in its support for Pakistan. During the Security Council deliberations in 1957, for instance, it had supported Pakistan's claim that the promulgation of the State Constitution by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 17 November 1956 which, among other things, had declared the State's affiliation with India, represented an important new element in the situation. The Security Council, it had maintained, was bound to take note of this change and, to this end, had tabled the draft resolution reaffirming previous Council and UNCIP resolutions, especially the one passed on 30 March 1951, that the future of Kashmir was to be determined by a plebiscite held under UN auspices and that any action taken by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly would not constitute a disposition of the state in conformity with the above principles.⁸⁵ More importantly, the United States cosponsored a draft resolution on 14 February 1957, later vetoed by the Soviet Union, requesting the

⁸³ S.C.O.R.: Seventeenth Year, 1010th meeting, 4 May 1962, S/PV 1010, pp. 2-3, 8; and Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir: 1947 to 1966, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 64.

⁸⁴ 'Statement by the Soviet representative Fedorenko in the Security Council, 14 February 1964', in R. K. Jain, op. cit., pp. 53-57.

⁸⁵ S.C.O.R.: Twelfth Year, 764th meeting, 23 January 1957, S/PV 764, pp. 9-10.

President of the Security Council to examine the possibility of stationing a temporary United Nations force in Kashmir as suggested by Pakistan.⁸⁶

At the turn of the 1960s, however, as the prospects of an Indo-US rapprochement became brighter, the United States had moved from a pro-Pakistani to a neutral stand on the Kashmir question. Unwilling to use its economic assistance to New Delhi, which had increased from US\$ 305. 1 million in 1958 to US\$ 758. 4 million in 1960, as a means of exerting pressure on India to compromise on Kashmir, the United States Government began to underscore the significance of mediation and bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute. In January 1962 President Kennedy suggested to his Indian and Pakistani counterparts, Nehru and Ayub, that they accept Eugene Black, who had been instrumental in concluding the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, as a mediator to resolve their difference on the Kashmir.⁸⁷ Five months later, during the Security Council debate on the issue, the US representative, Stevenson, supported the recommendation made by Frank P. Graham in March 1958 that India and Pakistan should consider the proposal for a high-level conference to resolve their differences over Kashmir.⁸⁸ The US policy of refraining from putting pressure on India to resolve the dispute had continued even after its decision to provide military assistance to India in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war. While encouraging India to hold bilateral talks with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, which started on 27 December 1962, the

⁸⁶The India-Pakistan Question: Kashmir: A Brief Study, (New York: United Nations, Permanent Mission of Pakistan, 1962), pp. 47-48.

⁸⁷Asian Recorder: 1962, p. 4452.

⁸⁸S. C. O. R: Seventeenth Year, 1012th meeting, 15 June 1962, S/PV 1012, pp. 2-4.

US Government, to the disappointment of its Pakistani counterpart, was careful to emphasise that the American military assistance to India was not contingent on its willingness to settle the Kashmir question with Pakistan. On 8 March 1963, for instance, when asked if further US military aid to India was conditional on the success of Indo-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir, Secretary Rusk stated that he would not in any sense qualify the US aid purposes by the word 'condition'.⁸⁹ Simultaneously, to the consternation of Pakistan authorities, the US Government had continued to highlight the efficacy of bilateral negotiations or mediation for resolving Indo-Pakistani differences on the Kashmir issue. In early 1964, for instance, following the serious civil disturbances in Kashmir caused by the disappearance of a sacred Islamic relic, a hair of the Prophet Mohammad, from Hazratbal shrine near Srinagar in late 1963, the Pakistan Government once again raised the Kashmir issue in the Security Council. During this debate, instead of supporting Pakistan's allegations of 'Indian colonialism' in Kashmir, its plea for a plebiscite and its claim that Islamabad was entitled to the Council's sympathy more than India, the US representative, Stevenson, suggested that the two countries should accept mediation and use the help of the good offices of the UN-Secretary General or any other person or country.⁹⁰ As the Soviets had moved to a pro-Indian stance, and the US from support for Pakistan to a neutral position, China abandoned its neutral stand and began to support Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite.

However, it is pertinent to point out that while providing

⁸⁹United States Department of State Bulletin, (Hereafter cited as USDSB), 25 March 1963, cited by Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

⁹⁰S. C. O. R. Nineteenth Year, 1091st meeting, 14 February 1964, S/PV 1091, p. 16; and Asian Recorder 1964, p. 5724.

political support to Pakistan against India, Beijing was cautious not to overtly endorse or encourage any aggressive action that Pakistan might seem to be contemplating. Soon after the Indian Government's decision on 4 December 1964 to apply the Constitution, which was to enable the President of India to proclaim Presidential rule and legislature in Kashmir, for instance, the Pakistan Government had issued a number of statements threatening India with 'disastrous consequences' if Kashmir was actually amalgamated more fully into the Indian Union. On 26 December 1964 the Foreign Minister Bhutto had vouchsafed to 'fight to the last moment' and teach India a lesson.⁹¹ This was followed, in January 1965, by the Pakistan National Assembly's strong protest against 'India's stranglehold on Kashmir' and the demand for 'determined measures' to help Kashmiris 'liberate' themselves.⁹² The next month, in his nationwide broadcast President Ayub observed that if a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute was not found, the final solution would mean a greater loss to India.⁹³ These and other similar statements were neither reported nor commented upon by the Chinese news media.

More importantly, the Chinese Government exhibited a reluctance to highlight its support for Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir issue during Ayub's first visit to Beijing in March 1965. The welcoming editorials published in the Jen-min Jih-pao, Ta-kung-pao and the Kuang-ming Jih-pao on 2nd March 1965, for instance, made absolutely no mention of the Chinese stand on Kashmir.⁹⁴ Neither did Liu

⁹¹ Dawn, 27 December 1964.

⁹² Dawn, 22 January 1965.

⁹³ Mohammed Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. VII, July 1964-June 1965, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, no date), p. 135.

⁹⁴ 'Jen-min Jih-pao Welcomes President Ayub Khan', NCNA, 2 March 1964, in SCMP, No. 3410, 5 March 1964, pp. 29-30; and '"We Welcome You, President Ayub Khan" - Say Beijing Papers', NCNA, 2 March 1964, in Ibid., pp. 30-31.

Shao-chi, unlike his Pakistani guest, refer to 'the fair and equitable stand adopted by China' on the Kashmir issue in the state banquet held the same evening.⁹⁵ Four days later, in an interview, the contents of which were not reported by the NCNA, Chinese Vice Premier, Chen Yi reiterated his Government's stand on the Kashmiris' right to self-determination but expressed the hope that the issue would not be raised by Pakistan at the Afro-Asian conference.⁹⁶ The next day China joined Pakistan in expressing 'its concern that the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved' and 'reaffirmed that the issue should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan.'⁹⁷ However, unlike during Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in 1964, the Chinese leaders and news media completely refrained from highlighting their reference to the Kashmir issue in the subsequent meetings and news coverage.⁹⁸ Significantly, the Jen-min Jin-pao editorial published at the end of Ayub's visit to China on 9 March 1965 only referred to China's support for 'Pakistan's struggle against imperialist and big-nation chauvinistic threats and pressures' without even mentioning the Kashmir issue which, at that time, was the highest on Pakistan's list

⁹⁵ 'Chairman Liu Shao-chi Hails Sino-Pakistan Friendship', NCNA, 2 March 1965, in Ibid., pp. 27-28; and 'President Ayub Khan at Beijing Banquet Acclaims Pakistan-Chinese Friendship', NCNA, 2 March 1965, in Ibid., pp. 28-59.

⁹⁶ Dawn, 7 March 1965; and 'Vice Premier Chen I Receives Pakistan Correspondents', NCNA, 6 March 1965, in SCMP, No. 3413, 10 March 1965, p. 43.

⁹⁷ NCNA, 7 March 1965, in SCMP, No. 3414, 11 March 1965, p. 32.

⁹⁸ Soon after the Joint Communique was issued on 23 February 1964, for instance, Chou En-lai had referred to the Chinese support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue in his speech at the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly. This was followed, on 26 February 1964, by Chou En-lai's reiteration of this stand in a press conference. In marked contrast, no such references were made after the Joint Communique issued on Ayub-Chou talks in March 1965. NCNA, 24 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3167, February 1964, p. 39; and NCNA, 26 February 1964, in SCMP, No. 3169, 2 March 1964, p. 30.

of priorities.⁹⁹ Similarly, in its reportage of Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in June 1965, when both India and Pakistan had massed their troops on the borders, the Chinese news media avoided referring to Beijing's stand on Kashmir and, instead, concentrated on Beijing's objections to US imperialism's activities in Vietnam.¹⁰⁰

While refraining from endorsing Pakistan's plans to resolve the Kashmir issue by force, the Chinese Government was also careful to underscore that it did not approve of Pakistan's adventurism in other sectors of its borders with India either. On 8 April 1965, for instance, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch, an area of disputed territory on the Arabian Sea about 350 miles north-west of Bombay. Soon afterwards, pressing their logistical advantages, the Pakistanis out-fought and out-maneuvred the Indians. Throughout this period, the Chinese news media maintained a studied silence on the fighting. It was only on 4 May 1965, when it had become clear that British mediation would succeed in ending the hostilities, that the Chinese Government issued a statement which, while expressing support for Pakistan and identifying India as the aggressor, drew attention to Pakistan's public posture of settling the issue peacefully. 'The Chinese Government and people', it stated, 'fully sympathise with and support the solemn and just stand of the Pakistan Government in opposing the Indian policy of military expansion and advocating settlement of the

⁹⁹ 'Jen-min Jih-pao Welcomes New Development of Sino-Pakistan Relations', NCNA, 9 March 1965, in SCMP, No. 3415, 12 March 1965; Interestingly, another article published in Ta-kung Pao on 8 March 1965 recalling Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in February 1964 also omitted any references to his views on the Kashmir issue. NCNA, 8 March 1965, in Ibid., pp. 36-37.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, 'Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial Acclaims Premier Chou En-lai's Visit to Pakistan, Tanzania', NCNA, 3 June 1965, in SCMP, No. 3473, 9 June 1965, pp. 27-29.

border dispute through peaceful negotiations'.¹⁰¹

This cautious policy, which most probably was caused by Beijing's realization that a spectre of a Sino-Pakistani collusion in creating regional instability might encourage the United States and the Soviet Union to enhance their level of support to India against China, changed during the second half of 1965.

The Indo-Pakistan War (1965) and China

Since early August 1965, emboldened by the Pakistan Army's relative success in the Rann of Kutch war and convinced that, in view of the Security Council's inability to resolve the Kashmir issue, the only option left open for Pakistan was to wage a camouflage war in Kashmir, Ayub Khan had been sending several thousand trained guerrillas into the State. The Indian Government determined to meet this 'thinly disguised attack', had retaliated by ordering its troops to advance to the points from which the infiltrators were entering Kashmir and, therefore, by the end of August 1965 was not only controlling the main routes of infiltration but was also in the advantageous position of advancing towards the capital of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. To this, Islamabad had reacted on 1 September 1965 by ordering its regular Army troops to cross the 1949 ceasefire line at the Chamb sector of Jammu while keeping the fighting limited to the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. On 6 September, however, in order to relieve pressure on the Kashmir front, the Indian Army crossed the Punjab frontier and attacked Lahore and Sialkot simultaneously. Soon the war escalated on land and in the air and was fought practically all along the West

¹⁰¹Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, (London: Pall Mall press, 1968), pp. 287-294; and NCNA, 4 May 1965, in SCMP, No. 3452, 7 May 1965, p. 31 (emphasis added).

Pakistan-India border.¹⁰²

Immediately prior to the outbreak of a full-scale war, the Chinese Government which had refrained from taking notice of the developments in Kashmir during August 1965, came out openly in support of Pakistan. On 4 September 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, made an unannounced stopover in Karachi on his way to Mali and discussed the situation with his Pakistan counterpart, Bhutto. The same evening, in a press conference, he condemned India for its provocative acts of violating the ceasefire line and for kindling and aggravating the conflict, and 'firmly' supported 'Pakistan's just action in hitting back'. He also reiterated his Government's stand that 'the Kashmir question should be settled according to the pledges made by India and Pakistan to the Kashmiri people and in accordance with the aspirations of the Kashmir people'.¹⁰³

The next day, an article published in the Jen-min Jin-pao supported Pakistan's declaratory view of the developments in Kashmir. '...[P]ressed beyond the limits of endurance', it stated, 'the people in the Indian occupied sector of Kashmir...[had] started a massive armed resistance [early August 1965]...'. The Indian government had sent large numbers of troops and police for sanguinary suppression but the local people had put up a firm resistance. Under these circumstances, to divert public attention at home and to mislead public opinion abroad, the article explained, the Indian reactionaries had been trying to shift the responsibility of its crimes onto Pakistan by alleging that Pakistan had attacked Kashmir

¹⁰²Brines, op. cit., pp. 304-326; and Sen Gupta, op. cit., pp. 196-199.

¹⁰³NCNA, 4 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3535, 13 September 1965, p. 35.

ceasefire line and had launched provocations against Pakistan. Such circumstances, it maintained, justified Pakistan's decision to strike back in self-defence and, therefore, it continued, the Chinese people deeply sympathized with, and supported the actions of, the Kashmiri people and Pakistan.¹⁰⁴

This was followed, on 7 September 1965, by the Chinese Government's statement on the Indo-Pakistan war. This statement accused India of launching a sudden armed attack on Pakistan, and of enlarging the local conflict between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, which had resulted entirely from India's refusal to abide by its promise for a plebiscite in the valley, into a general conflict between the two countries. It also questioned the United Nations' neutrality in the conflict. 'Eighteen years have passed', the statement read, 'during which the United Nations did not breathe a single word when India violated the ceasefire line. But as soon as Pakistan fought back in self-defense, the United Nations came out to mediate. 'It is inconceivable', it maintained, 'that the United Nations, which has been unfair for eighteen years, should suddenly become fair'. The statement concluded with declaration of the Chinese Government's support for Pakistan, and the conviction that the latter would finally drive back the Indian aggressors.¹⁰⁵

Thereafter, the Chinese Government consistently supported Pakistan against India. On 9 September 1965, speaking at an official reception in Beijing, Chou En-lai labelled India as 'an outright aggressor both in the local conflict in Kashmir and the general

¹⁰⁴ 'Chinese People Sympathize with Kashmir Struggle for Self-Determination: Says Jen-min Jih-pao', NCNA, 5 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3535, 13 September 1965, pp. 33-38.

¹⁰⁵ 'Chinese Government's Statement on India's Armed Attack on Pakistan', NCNA, 7 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3536, 24 September 1965, pp. 31-23 (emphasis added).

conflict between India and Pakistan'.¹⁰⁶ The same day, speaking at the airport in Algiers, Chen Yi equated Indian aggression against Pakistan with that of the United States in Vietnam.¹⁰⁷ The next day, Chinese Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-chih strongly condemned the Indian reactionaries for their naked aggression against Pakistan.¹⁰⁸ This was followed, on 11 September 1965, by an editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao which identified the conflict between India and Pakistan as 'a struggle between an aggressor and its victim'. India's claim, it argued, that Pakistan had invaded Kashmir, mounted a thinly disguised armed attack and that India was merely taking 'an inescapable measure of self-defense' was 'an outright lie'. In reality, it argued, it was India which had first crossed the cease-fire line, launched military provocations, used its air force and crossed the international border and launched massive armed attacks. 'So', it maintained, 'India is in every sense the aggressor and Pakistan its victim'.¹⁰⁹ The United Nations, however, it was argued by a commentator in Ta-Kung Pao the next day, manipulated by the United States ... [with full cooperation of the modern revisionists], was reticent to acknowledge this distinction between aggressor and victim, and right and wrong, and condemn India.¹¹⁰ The Jen-min Jih-pao editorial published on 14 September 1965 repeated this allegation and criticised the Security Council's resolution of 6

¹⁰⁶ 'Chou En-lai Condemns Indian Armed Attack on Pakistan', NCNA, 9 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3537, 15 September 1965, pp. 30-31.

¹⁰⁷ 'Chen Yi Reiterates Support for Pakistan Against Indian Aggression', NCNA, 9 September 1965, in Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁰⁸ 'Chinese Vice Premier Condemns Aggression by Indian Reactionaries', NCNA, 10 September 1965, in Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁰⁹ 'Indian Reactionaries Are Plain Aggressor, Says Jen-min Jih-pao', NCNA, 11 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3538, 16 September 1965, pp. 31-34 (emphasis added).

¹¹⁰ 'Ta-kung Pao: UN Maneuvers ^(sic) Cannot Whitewash Indian Aggression', NCNA, 12 September 1965, in Ibid., pp. 34-35.

September 1965, which had called upon both India and Pakistan (and not India alone) to stop fighting, for being couched in general terms and 'acquitting the Indian aggressor'.¹¹¹

These, and other similar editorials,¹¹² showed significant Chinese declaratory support for Pakistan against India in the war. Of even greater significance was Chinese actual support for Islamabad. Pakistan had initiated the camouflage war in Kashmir with the aim of either seizing the valley militarily or, indirectly, securing the Security Council's intervention to organise a plebiscite in Kashmir. The successful Indian retaliation and the ensuing stalemate in Kashmir, however, had rendered a seizure of Kashmir by Pakistan almost an impossibility. Neither was Pakistan being successful in eliciting 'a favourable response' from the Security Council, which, for instance, had refused its request to include a reference to the previous UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir in its resolution of 4 September 1965 and had asked 'both parties to promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5'.¹¹³ Similarly, the Security Council's resolution of 6 September, while noting the extension of fighting 'with deep concern', had made no promise that an effort would be made to resolve the Kashmir issue in accordance with previous UN resolutions.¹¹⁴ Under the circumstances, Pakistan's top military men had formulated a contingency plan of asking China, which had assured its full support to Pakistan, to move up against and

¹¹¹'UN Is Sanctuary for Indian Aggressor, Says Jen-min Jih-pao', NCNA, 14 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3539, 17 September 1965, pp. 31-34.

¹¹²See, for example, 'Indian Reactionaries Reveal True Colours As Aggressors, Says Ta-kung Pao Editorial', NCNA, 15 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3541, 21 September 1965, pp. 32-35.

¹¹³Asian Recorder: 1965, p. 6699.

¹¹⁴Burke, op. cit., p. 339.

occupy a large tract of India's territory in the North East Frontier Agency, thereby siphoning much of India's pressure off the Kashmir border and enabling the Pakistan Army to seize Kashmir.¹¹⁵ The outline of this contingency plan, it seems, was revealed to the Chinese Government during a meeting between Chou En-lai and Pakistan Ambassador, General Raza, on 7 September 1965. The next day, upon receiving an assurance from Ayub that Pakistan would not submit to the US, Soviet or UN pressure for a solution of the Kashmir issue favourable to India,¹¹⁶ the Chinese Government put its forces on the Sino-Indian border on alert and sent a note to the Indian Government. This note protested against 'repeated intrusions' by Indian troops into Chinese territory in both the eastern and western sectors during July and August 1965 and linked these developments with Indian armed aggression against Pakistan. More importantly, it demanded that India should dismantle all 'aggressive military structures built on or beyond the China-Sikkim border, withdraw its aggressive forces and stop all its provocations. Otherwise', the note warned, 'India must bear responsibility for all the consequences'.¹¹⁷ This was followed, after Air Marshal Asghar Khan's secret visit to Beijing on 12 September 1965 when the contingency plan prepared by the Pakistani Generals was discussed at length¹¹⁸ by a Chinese ultimatum to India on 16 September demanding that it should 'dismantle within three days

¹¹⁵Choudhury, op. cit., p. 190; see also M. Asghar Khan, The First Round Indo-Pakistan War 1966, (Sahibabad: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd 1979), p. 37.

¹¹⁶Choudhury, op. cit., p. 189.

¹¹⁷NCNA, 8 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3536, 14 September 1965, pp. 30-31.

¹¹⁸Choudhury, op. cit., p. 189. Though Asghar Khan identifies 9 September 1965 as the date when he travelled to Beijing to discuss the contingency plan, the fact that reports Chen Yi's visit to Pakistan in early September as having taken place on the 1 or 2 September, instead of 4 September 1965, suggests that Choudhury's account is more reliable. Asghar Khan, op. cit., pp. 38, 110-111.

its aggressive military works on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself. 'Otherwise', the Chinese Government threatened, 'the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom'.¹¹⁹

Though, in view of its cautious policy, it is highly unlikely that it would have actually carried the threat out, Beijing, by issuing this ultimatum assisted Pakistan in achieving one of its war objectives. While dismissing the ultimatum as 'diversionary tactics', the British and American leaders expressed fears that given the disparity between the Indian and Chinese troop strengths on the Himalayan frontier¹²⁰ the Chinese Government, if it actually acted according to the ultimatum, could alter the complexion of the Indo-Pakistan war. China's help to Pakistan, it was feared, would bring the US and the Soviet Union to India's aid thereby escalating a regional conflict into a major war. This spectre of a major war forced the Security Council to take a serious view of the situation and, therefore, on 20 September 1965 it passed a resolution which not only called for a ceasefire but demanded that it take effect on 22 September 1965 at 0700 GMT. Significantly, the Security Council, for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities in Kashmir, conceded to Pakistan's demand for referring to the underlying cause of the war, i.e. the Kashmir issue. In its 20 September 1965 resolution, the Council stated that, after the war, it would meet to consider the steps 'to resolve the political causes underlying the conflict'.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ 'Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note to India', NCNA, 17 September 1965, in SCMP, No. 3541, 21 September 1965, pp. 30-32 (emphasis added).

¹²⁰ The total Chinese troop strength on Himalayan frontier ranged from 100,000 to 300,000 as compared to total Indian troop strength of 112,000 to 126,000 in the same area. The Economist, 18 September 1965, p. 1092, and 25 September 1965, p. 1203.

¹²¹ Cited by Burke, op. cit., p. 340.

This enabled the Pakistan Government, which had consistently refused to agree to a ceasefire without the Security Council's guarantee that an attempt to resolve the Kashmir issue would be made, to get out of the war without a loss of face at a juncture when, due to the US arms embargo placed soon before the war, its army was facing the danger of complete depletion of resources within a period of three to five weeks.¹²²

The Post-War Years

Soon after the ceasefire on 23 September, the Pakistan Government accepted the Soviet offer of good offices to help negotiate a settlement with India which had been made as early as 4 September.¹²³ The Chinese Government, in spite of its consistent criticism of the Soviet offer, did not react to Islamabad's decision by withdrawing its support for Pakistan. The Chinese news media continued to accuse India of committing aggression against Kashmir and Pakistan, and emphasise Beijing's support for Islamabad in repelling any further 'naked aggression'.¹²⁴ Even after the conclusion of the Tashkent Conference (4-10 January 1966), Beijing did not depart from this policy and consistently stressed the durability of its support for, and closeness of its relations with Islamabad. In March 1966, for instance, Liu Shao Chi visited Pakistan and declared 'The Pakistan people can rest assured that, when Pakistan resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defence of its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,

¹²²The Economist, 9 October 1965, p.144; and The Times (London), 28 October 1965.

¹²³For text see, The Statesman, 12 September 1965.

¹²⁴See, for instance, 'Jen-min Jih-pao Supports Pakistan's Just Stand', NCNA, 21 November 1965, in SCMP, No. 3585, 26 November 1965, pp. 28-29.

the 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance'.¹²⁵ Three months later, Chou En-lai, during his visit to Pakistan reiterated this assurance and stressed that, in spite of all the attempts to sabotage it, the Sino-Pakistani friendship could not be broken.¹²⁶

This continued political support was supplemented with military support. To assist Pakistan's Armed Forces in recuperating from the losses incurred during the war, the Chinese Government agreed in late 1965 and provided, by the end of 1966, 4 MIG-15 (UTI), 4 IL-28, 40 MIG-19s (F-6) and approximately 80 T-59 tanks.¹²⁷ Beijing also initiated negotiations with Pakistan to assist in setting up an ordnance factory at Ghazipur, East Pakistan¹²⁸ but while these negotiations were continuing, China plunged into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

For the next two and a half years, the number of visits exchanged between the two states was reduced drastically, as was Chinese news media coverage of developments in Pakistan.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, the Chinese Government did continue to reflect an interest in maintaining friendly relations with Pakistan. Firstly, for instance, the NCNA made references to the Pakistani peoples'

¹²⁵'Chairman Liu Shao-chi Speaks at Pakistan State Banquet', NCNA, 26 March 1966, in SCMP, No. 3669, 31 March 1966, p. 30.

¹²⁶'Premier Chou En-lai Feted by Pakistan President Ayub Khan', NCNA, 29 June 1966, in SCMP, No. 3732, 6 July 1966, p. 34.

¹²⁷SIPRI Arms Trade Register: Arms Trade with the Third World, (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1975), p. 37-70

¹²⁸Pakistan Times, 7 April 1970.

¹²⁹Compared to a total of 64 news items broadcast during the first half of 1966, for instance, the NCNA broadcast only 24 news items on Pakistan during the first half of 1967. Similarly, the number of visits exchanged between the two states had reduced from 10 in the first half of 1966 to 3 in the same period in 1967. SCMP Index: 1966, and SCMP Index 1967.

preference for Mao's ideology¹³⁰ but refrained from discussing the role of peasants in Pakistan -- a reference which would have been construed as aimed at undermining the Pakistani Government's stability. In fact, quite interestingly, Beijing began to re-emphasise after an interval of two years the significance of the 'Islamic link' between China and Pakistan.¹³¹ Secondly, during the limited number of exchange of visits, the Chinese Government consistently underscored that, contrary to the imperialists' and modern revisionists' propaganda, its foreign policy orientation had not been altered due to the Cultural Revolution and that, as before, China supported Pakistan's and its demand for the Kashmiris' right of self-determination.¹³² Thirdly, Beijing not only continued and concluded the negotiations for the Ordnance factory in East Pakistan but also provided loans worth US\$6.9 million and US\$40.6 million to Pakistan in January 1967.¹³³

Hence, it can be argued that after moving from a correct to a friendly policy towards Pakistan at the turn of the 1960s, the Chinese Government continuously reflected an interest in maintaining a durable and friendly relationship with Pakistan until the end of year 1968.

Conclusion

In summary, as in 1950s, the beginning of the seventh decade

¹³⁰ See, for instance, NCNA, 24 May 1967, in SCMP, No. 3947, 26 May 1967, p. 49.

¹³¹ During the second half of 1966, for instance, a delegation of Chinese Muslims visited Pakistan, and frequently emphasised that, as in Pakistan, the Chinese Muslims were free to practice their religion. Dawn, 2 July 1966.

¹³² See, for instance, NCNA, 29 September 1967, in SCMP, No. 4033, 3rd October 1967, pp. 30-31; and NCNA, 4 August 1968, in SCMP, No. 4326, 12 August 1968, pp. 27-28.

¹³³ Pakistan Economic Survey: 1970-71, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 1971), p. 86.

witnessed China keeping its options open vis-a-vis Pakistan. Within two years, however, this policy underwent a change. Beijing cautiously moved to improve relations with Pakistan. The major indication was its willingness to enter into negotiations, even if slow and protracted, to settle the boundary question with Pakistan. Once convinced of Islamabad's interest in improving relations with China, Beijing increased the pace of normalisation of relations with Pakistan. A boundary agreement was concluded and followed, within a short span of time, by air travel and trade agreements. Beijing also, in marked contrast to its neutral 1950s position, began to support Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir dispute. The climax came in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war; apart from consistently issuing pro-Pakistan and anti-India statements Beijing issued an ultimatum to New Delhi and indirectly created conditions which enabled Ayub Khan to bring the war to an 'honourable' end for Pakistan. Soon after the war, China also began to provide military assistance to Pakistan. This was accompanied by aid for economic development and maximum political support on the Kashmir issue --- a trend which continued till the end of 1968.

This chapter raises a number of questions that will be answered in Chapter IX. The list includes: Why did China decide to move closer to Pakistan in the early 1960s? To what extent was this move triggered by the Sino-Indian war of 1962? What role did China's perceptions of the US and Soviet policies towards the mainland play in this change?